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Abstract
Initiated from Nakamoto’s Bitcoin system, blockchain technology has demonstrated great capability of building
secure consensus among decentralized parties at Internet-scale, i.e., without relying on any centralized trusted party.
Nowadays, blockchain systems find applications in various fields. But the performance is increasingly becoming a
bottleneck, especially when permissionless participation is retained for full decentralization.
In this work, we present a new consensus protocol named GHAST (Greedy Heaviest Adaptive Sub-Tree) which
organizes blocks in a Tree-Graph structure (i.e., a directed acyclic graph (DAG) with a tree embedded) that allows
fast and concurrent block generation. GHAST protocol simultaneously achieves a logarithmically bounded liveness
guarantee and low confirmation latency. More specifically, for maximum latency d and adversarial computing power
bounded away from 50%, GHAST guarantees confirmation with confidence ≥ 1 − ε after a time period of O(d ·
log(1/ε)). When there is no observable attack, GHAST only needs 3d time to achieve confirmation at the same
confidence level as six-block-confirmation in Bitcoin, while it takes roughly 360d in Bitcoin.
1 Introduction
Blockchain systems like Bitcoin provide secure, decentralized, and consistent ledgers at Internet-scale. Such ledgers
are initially designed for cryptocurrencies, but now have evolved to become a powerful abstraction that fuels innova-
tions on many real-world applications across financial systems [3], supply chains [9], and health cares [4].
A novel aspect of blockchain systems is permissionless. It allows anyone to join or leave the system freely without
getting approval from some centralized or distributed community. During the blockchain protocol execution, it is
not necessary for any participant to be aware of others, once the protocol message from the other participants can be
relayed on time. In order to prevent malicious behavior in a permissionless setting, the blockchain systems limit the
rate for constructing new blocks using the idea of computational puzzles, which is called proof-of-work. To construct
a valid block accepted by the blockchain protocol, the participants need to set a proper nonce in block to make the
hash value of such block fall in a prescribed bit-string set. (e.g., the set contains bit-string with 70 leading zeros.) So
all the participants need to try a large number of different nonces before finding a valid block.
The robustness of a blockchain system requires a majority of computing power is held by honest participants. So
in the long term, the honest participants will generate more blocks than the attacker. Based on this fact, the blockchain
protocol directs the participants to organize blocks and select a sequence of blocks as history. For example, Bitcoin
adopts Nakamoto consensus protocol [17] which operates on a tree of blocks and selects the longest branch as its
correct history. All the honest participants are required to append new blocks to the longest branch. Ideally, all the
blocks generated by the honest participants will extend the longest chain in Nakamoto consensus. If we assume the
attacker controls at most β computing power (β < 1/2) in total, for each block, we can compute the risk that such
block is kicked out of history under the optimal attack strategy in the future. If the risk does not exceed a given
threshold, we say a block is confirmed. Once a block is confirmed, we have high confidence for the transactions (e.g.,
payment message) carried in such block is recorded on the blockchain irreversible. A protocol that lacks consideration
of all possible attack strategies may provide an incorrect way to estimate confirmation risk. And further, a confirmed
block may be kicked out of the history frequently. It is regarded as a security flaw. So a rigorous security analysis
handling all the possible attack cases is necessary for a blockchain protocol.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The network propagation delay brings issues in reaching consensus. Since a block can not be relayed to other
participants instantly, the participants sometimes have an inconsistent view of the current block sets. The influence
of network delay depends on the protocol parameters. A blockchain protocol can adjust the block generation interval
by adjusting the difficulty of finding a valid block. If the block generation interval is much higher than the time
propagating a message in network, with a high probability, no one will generate a new block when the participants
have inconsistent local blocks. The blockchain protocol works in a synchronized network. For the opposite situation,
there will be a considerable amount of blocks which generated when the participants have an inconsistent view and
may cause the participants to diverge. For example, the participants may regard different branches as the longest
branch. For a consensus protocol running in a low block generation interval, the protocol design must deal with the
inconsistency view carefully.
A high block generation interval results in a bad performance. A higher block generation interval means fewer
blocks are generated in a given time interval. So the consensus protocol has a low throughput. A high block gener-
ation interval also results in a high block confirmation delay. For example, Nakamoto consensus requires the block
propagation delay d (i.e., the delay of one block propagating to all participants in the P2P network) must be signif-
icantly smaller than the block generation interval of 1/λ. Otherwise, a large number of blocks will be generated in
the scenario that another block is in propagation. These blocks will not contribute to the growth of the longest chain.
Once the chain growth of the longest chain slowing down, it requires less cost for the attacker to construct a side chain
competing with the confirmed history. Furthermore, the confirmation of a block has to wait for several subsequent
blocks, since in a permissionless consensus system the agreement is only observable through mined blocks. Therefore
Nakamoto consensus has to operate with very low block generation rate (e.g., 1 MB blocks per 10 minutes in Bit-
coin) and suffer from unsatisfactory throughput and confirmation latency (e.g., 6 blocks or equivalently 60 minutes in
Bitcoin).
Performance becomes one of the major obstacles that impede the adoption of blockchain techniques. To resolve
the performance issues in Nakamoto consensus, several new protocols are proposed in the last five years. Some
of them have a rigorous security analysis. Garay et al [7] first provide a rigorous security analysis for Nakamoto
consensus in a synchronized network model. They prove two properties of Nakamoto consensus, the common prefix
and the chain quality. Pass et al [19] consider the effect of network delay and provide an analysis in an asynchronized
network model with a prior maximum network delay d. They prove an additional property, the chain-growth. Several
subsequent works [5, 20, 25] built their security analysis on the top of the basic properties in Nakamoto consensus.
These works achieve a good performance in throughput. However, since they build security on the top of Nakamoto
consensus, they can not achieve a better confirmation latency than Nakamoto consensus.
In the same period, Sompolinsky et al [24] introduce GHOST (Greedy Heaviest-Observed Sub-Tree), which uses
another way to select the branch. However, they only analysis the behavior of GHOST under some attack cases. Later,
Kiayias et al [10] provide a security analysis for GHOST in a low block generation rate under a synchronized network
model.
Unfortunately, Natoli et al [18] point out GHOST is vulnerable in a liveness attack when the block generation
rate is high. The liveness attack is not aimed to re-ordering the confirmed blocks but tries to prevent from confirming
the new blocks. They provide an attack strategy called the balance attack for a high block generation rate. We will
introduce the details of this attack in Section 2.
We notice that a high block generation rate helps reduce confirmation delay. Given a time interval of T , let
random variable X denote the ratio of newly generate blocks between malicious blocks and honest blocks. Since the
proof-of-work protocols always assume the attacker has less computing power compared to the honest participants,
the expectation of X is less than 1. The higher block generation rate, the lower variance X will have. So it is less
likely for an attacker to generate more blocks than honest participants in a given time interval. The blocks can gain
an advantage in subtree weight compared to the attacker’s side chain quickly and achieve a lower confirmation delay.
However, the existing protocols built on the top Nakamoto consensus can not break the barrier of confirmation delay
in Nakamoto consensus and GHOST suffers a liveness issue in a high block generation rate.
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1.1 Our contributions
This paper presents the GHAST (Greedy Heaviest Adaptive Sub-Tree) consensus protocol which achieves a nearly
optimal confirmation delay in a normal case with rigorous security analysis. This protocol is designed based on the
GHOST protocol with a high block generation rate. In order to resolve the liveness issue in GHOST protocol, GHAST
slows down the block generation rate to defense the liveness attack. More precisely, when detecting a divergence
of computing power, the block weight distribution is adaptively changed. Only a small fraction of blocks selected
randomly are marked as “heavy blocks” and other blocks generated under this circumstance are valid but have zero
weight. The block generation rate remains to keep a high throughput. In other words, only the heavy blocks are taken
into consideration in the branch selection.
This work is the first design of a high-throughput BlockDAG consensus protocol (among all DAG-based consensus
proposals including a bunch of GHOST-like protocols) that has a rigorous security analysis and liveness against an
attacker with the ability to manipulate network delay. Furthermore, our protocol is also the first consensus protocol
that provides both efficiency and robustness: 1) fast confirmation when there is no observable attack, i.e., the agreed
history is immutable against covert attacks; and 2) polynomially bounded worst-case liveness when there is an active
attack with 49% block generation power as well as the ability to arbitrarily manipulate the delay of every block within
the maximum propagation delay bound d (recall that blocks exceeding this bound are counted as malicious).
Liveness guarantee We prove that GHAST guarantees security and liveness in the presence of an active attacker who
has the power of manipulating communication delays of every block to every participant. Similar to the framework in
the analysis of Nakamoto consensus, we have the following assumptions.
• The block generation rate of all the participants is λ.
• The adversary controls β computing powers among all the participants. (β < 1/2) In other words, the block
generation rate of the adversary is βλ.
• There is a maximum latency d within which a block will be propagated to all honest nodes.
Once a block is received by all the honest participants, its order in history will be consistent among all the honest
participants and become unchangeable after time O(log(ε)), with probability 1 − ε. More precisely, we have the
following theorem.
Theorem 1.1 (Informal) For every risk tolerance ε > 0 and fixed system parameters λ, d, β, let δ := 1− β/(1− β),
if λd ≥ 5 + 0.8 log(1/δ), there exist appropriate parameters such that GHAST guarantees that every block broadcast
before time t is confirmed with confidence ≥ (1− ε) by time t+ d ·O
(
log(1/δε)
δ3
)
.
A formal version is given in theorem 4.13.
Low confirmation delay GHAST achieves fast confirmation time in the absence of an observable attack. Here an
unobservable attack includes both cases of attacks that happened in the future and covertly withholding blocks without
attempting to influence the current state (but withheld blocks may be released in the future). That is, as long as the
attacker is not actively inuencing the Block-TG consensus system, transactions can be confirmed quickly and become
immutable once confirmed even if under the fast conrmation rule. We provide a concrete method in estimating the
block confirmation risk and runs an experiment. The system parameters in the experiment can tolerate liveness attacks
from a powerful attacker that controls 40% of the network computation power. Conflux blockchain system running the
GHAST protocol result in [14]shows that GHAST can obtain the same confidence as waiting for six blocks in Bitcoin
in 3d. While Bitcoin requires 360d and Prism requires 23d.
1.2 Main techniques
GHOST protocol and Tree-Graph structure. The GHAST consensus protocol adopts the GHOST protocol pro-
posed in [24] as the backbone of our protocol. We call the branch selected by GHOST protocol pivot chain.
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Borrowing ideas from previous works [13, 22, 23], GHAST organizes the block in the Tree-Graph structure.
Blocks in are Tree-Graph structure linked with two types of directed edges. Each block has one outgoing parent
edge to indicate its parent block under GHOST protocol. And it may have multiple outgoing reference edges to show
generation-before relationship between blocks. The parent edge and reference edges of a block are immutable. The
reference edges also reflect the local Tree-Graph of the block’s miner when generating such block.
Structured GHOST protocol. In structured GHOST protocol, only 1/ηw of blocks are weighted blocks that would
count in the chain selection process, where ηw is a protocol parameter. These blocks are selected randomly based on
their hash value. During the chain selection process, all the un-weighted blocks are skimmed. It is equivalent to slows
down block generation rate ηw times. Kiayias et al [10] prove that GHOST protocol has no liveness issue when the
block generation rate is low enough. Their proof is based on a synchronized network model, which is different from
our model. Our further analysis implies that this claim also holds in a partially synchronized network model.
Consensus with two strategies. The GHAST consensus protocol operates with two strategies, an optimistic strategy
following the GHOST protocol and a conservative strategy following the structured GHOST protocol. We adopt an
adaptive weight mechanism to incorporate two strategies into one framework. The blocks under the GHOST protocol
have block weight one and the weighted blocks under structured GHOST protocol have block weight ηw. So the
expected block weight does not vary while switching the strategies. In normal scenarios, the GHAST consensus
protocol adopts the optimistic strategy. When a serious liveness attack happens, the GHAST consensus protocol
switches to the conservative strategy. All the block headers include an immutable strategy bit to indicate the strategy
it adopts to make the miners reach a consensus for its block weight.
Enforced strategy choices. We found that if an attacker can fill the strategy bit arbitrarily, the confirmation delay
will be much worse than our expectations. So the GHAST consensus protocol determines the strategy bit of each block
based on its “past graph”. The past graph of a block refers to the set of all its reachable blocks following the parent
edges and reference edges recursively. When an honest miner generates a new block, its current local Tree-Graph is
the same as the past graph of this new block. If the past graph reflects an liveness attack is happening, the block should
follow the conservative strategy. Otherwise, it should follow the optimistic strategy.
We define a concrete rule to decide the consensus strategy from the past graph. A block whose strategy bit is
inconsistent with its past graph will be regarded as an invalid block and dropped by all the honest participants. So the
consensus strategy choices are enforced by the consensus protocol. Since the strategy bit can be inferred from its past
set, it can be omitted from the block header.
Notice that an attacker can still manipulate the strategy bit by ignoring some blocks in its past set. But its ability
to delay block confirmation can be significantly reduced.
Detecting liveness attack. The GHAST consensus protocol provides a deterministic algorithm to detect if there is
an active liveness attack given a past set and decide the consensus strategy. The GHAST consensus protocol detects
liveness attack following one idea:
Whether there exists an old enough block in the branch selected by GHOST rule,
its best child doesn’t have a dominant advantage in subtree weight compared to its sibling blocks.
Recalling that GHOST protocol selects the pivot chain by picking the child with maximum subtree weight recur-
sively. In the Tree-Graph in an honest participant’s view, if a block in the pivot chain doesn’t have a child with a
dominant advantage in subtree weight, other participants may have a different opinion in picking the next block in
pivot chain. If such a block has been generated for a long time, we suspected that a liveness attack is happening.
Partially-synchronized clock Pass et al [19] mentions that the Bitcoin protocol can be used as a partially-synchronized
clock. And their subsequent works Fruitchain [20] and Hybrid Consensus [21] show two examples that use Bitcoin
protocol as a fundamental service. The GHAST protocol also runs a stand-alone blockchain following Bitcoin pro-
tocol, which we called the timer chain. Each block in Tree-Graph structure includes the hash value of the longest
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branch leaf block in the timer chain. The height of the included timer block represents an imprecise timestamp. Given
a local Tree-Graph and a block in this Tree-Graph, if the timestamp difference between the given block and maxi-
mum timestamp in the local Tree-Graph exceeds a threshold ηb, we regard such block as an old enough block in the
Tree-Graph.
Notice that the GHAST consensus protocol only uses the timer chain to decide whether a block is old enough. The
order of Tree-Graph blocks does not rely on their timestamp. The blocks confirmation in Tree-Graph does not need to
wait for the confirmation of their timer block. In a normal scenario, a block in Tree-Graph is usually confirmed earlier
than its timer block.
Embedding timer chain into Tree-Graph. Some consensus protocols have multiple proof-of-work tasks. For ex-
ample, the GHAST consensus protocol has two proof-of-work tasks: mining a Tree-Graph block and mining a timer
block. In a parallel chain protocol like OHIE [25] and Prism [2], each individual chain has a proof-of-work task.
Usually, these protocols require that an attacker can not obtain majority computing power in each proof-of-work task.
In order to prevent the attacker from concentrating its computing power on one task, a widely used trick makes the
participants work on all the proof-of-work tasks simultaneously. It constructs a block that includes the components (or
the digests) of all the tasks. When a block is successfully mined, its hash value decides the block type.
Following this trick, the timer block and Tree-Graph block have the uniform block format, each of which includes
a parent edge, several reference edges, the hash value of the last timer block and other metadata such as transactions
digest in the application. The GHAST consensus protocol also regards the timer block as a valid Tree-Graph block.
1.3 Related work
Nakamoto consensus. Nakamoto consensus [17] is the first blockchain protocol. In Nakamoto Consensus, each
block has one predecessor block and all blocks form a tree rooted at the genesis block. Pass et al [19] build a round
based analysis framework for Nakamoto consensus in an asynchronized network model with a prior known maximum
network delay d. Given the adversary computing power threshold β, network delay d and block generation rate λ, they
show several properties of Nakamoto consensus when 1− λd > β/(1− β).
Some other blockchain systems like LiteCoin, Bitcoin Cash, Bitcoin Gold and Bitcoin SV tried to increase the
throughput by tuning system parameters in Nakamoto consensus. However, Sompolinsky et al [24] give the tradeoff
between increasing throughput of Nakamoto consensus and security threshold β. The Nakamoto consensus has two
parameters related to throughput: the block generation rate λ and block size s. The throughput of Nakamoto consensus
is bounded by λ · s. In a network with limited bandwidth b, the propagation delay d is lower bounded by s/b. Since
the previous analysis requires 1− λd > (1 + δ)β/(1− β), the throughput is upper bounded by (2−β)·s1−β .
FruitChain. FruitChain [20] organizes blocks hierarchically to decouple these functionalities. It packs transactions
first into fruits (i.e., micro blocks) and then packs fruits into blocks (i.e., macro blocks). Both types of blocks are re-
quired solutions for proof-of-work puzzle. But only the macro blocks are maintained following Nakamoto consensus.
The mining rewards in FruitChain are mainly distributed via micro blocks. It mitigates some problems like selfish
mining [6]. In a selfish mining attack, the attacker manipulates the longest chain by withholding its newly generated
block accordingly to increase the ratio of its block in the blockchain. This makes the attacker receive more mining
reward. In FruitChain, since the mining rewards are distributed according to micro blocks, it is no need to manipulate
the macro blocks and the attacker can not apply this apply strategy over micro blocks because they are not maintained
by Nakamoto consensus.
The drawback of FruitChain is that the block confirmation is built on the top of macro blocks, which follows
Nakamoto consensus. The micro blocks become irreversible only if the macro block packing it is confirmed. So the
confirmation delay of FruitChain is as worse as Nakamoto consensus.
Bitcoin-NG Bitcoin-NG [20] also organizes blocks hierarchically. In Bitcoin-NG, the key blocks (i.e., macro blocks)
are organized following Nakamoto consensus. Once a miner generates a macro block, it is allowed to generate a
sequence of light blocks (i.e., micro blocks) until the next miner generates a macro block. Each time a miner trying
to generate a macro block, it should try to include all the micro blocks generated by the owner of the previous macro
5
1.3 Related work 1 INTRODUCTION
block. Similar with FruitChain, the micro blocks are not taken into consideration in branch selection of macro blocks.
Bitcoin-NG has the same drawback as FruitChain since its security is also built on the Nakamoto Consensus.
Hybrid consensus Hybrid consensus [21] extends the idea in Bitcoin-NG. In Bitcoin-NG, a leader is chosen period-
ically based on the mining of macro blocks. Hybrid consensus picks a small quorum from the miner of macro blocks.
Unlike Bitcoin-NG, a miner is not included in the quorum at the time of its generation. Recalling that in Nakamoto
consensus, the longest branch truncating the last k blocks has consistent property. So Hybrid consensus picks quorum
from the truncated branch. As the blocks in the truncated branch become irreversible, the chosen quorum will not
change. This is different with Bitcoin-NG. The quorum runs a PBFT protocol to commit transactions.
In Hybrid consensus, the security threshold β drops to 1/3 to guarantee the attacker can not control more than 1/3
nodes in a selected quorum, which is the requirement of PBFT protocol. Hybrid also requires honestness has some
stickiness, i.e., it takes a short while for an adversary to corrupt a node. So the adversarial can not corrupt the whole
quorum instantly once a quorum is selected. However, such an assumption shows that the selected quorum is the single
point of failure for the whole consensus protocol. If an attacker continues to DDoS attack the newly selected quorum,
Hybrid consensus protocol will crash.
OHIE Another approach in increasing the throughput is running several parallel chains. In OHIE [25], the partic-
ipants mines on the hundreds of parallel chains simultaneously. When mining a block in OHIE, the miner needs to
include the parent block hash of the current block in each chain. Once a valid proof-of-work puzzle is solved, the
block hash determines which chain the new block belongs to. The parent blocks for each chain are selected following
Nakamoto consensus. Each individual chain has a low block generation rate to match the security requirement in
Nakamoto consensus. The parallel chain remains a low block generation rate for security and all the chains achieve a
high throughput collaboratively.
However, such design increases the cost in metadata extremely. In order to achieve desirable performance, OHIE
runs 640 parallel chains and generates 64 blocks per second. In security analysis of OHIE, a block will be confirmed in
OHIE only if it is confirmed in the individual chain it belongs to. So its confirmation time is worse than the Nakamoto
consensus.
Prism Prism [2] also runs parallel chains. Unlike OHIE, the parallel chains in Prism do not carry transactions. So
Prism does not need to order the blocks in parallel chains. Prism has three types of blocks: transaction blocks that
only pack transactions (like fruit in FruitChain), proposer blocks that pack transaction blocks and voter blocks that run
in parallel chains. The voter blocks will vote for the proposer blocks and pick a leader block for each height. Prism
orders the leader blocks according to their height. The leader block not necessarily appears in the longest branch. So
the block confirmation in Prism does not depend on the confirmation of proposer blockchain.
The most clever point in Prism is that the confirmation of a leader block does not need to wait for its voters become
irreversible. Though the delay for one voter block becomes irreversible is as worse as Nakamoto consensus, Prism
claims that reverting a majority of voter chains at the same time is much more difficult than reverting one voter chain.
So even if a few voter chains are reverted, as long as the leader block receives a majority votes, it is not reverted by the
attacker. Prism is the first proof-of-work consensus protocol that breaks confirmation barrier in Nakamoto consensus.
Our work has a better performance than Prism.
Prism still has some drawbacks. Similar to OHIE, parallel chains increase the amount of metadata in the protocol
significantly. Prism only provides a security analysis in a synchronized network model, which is doubted unrealistic
by [19].
GHOST Since the throughput in Nakamoto consensus is upper bounded by security threshold β, Sompolinsky et
al [24] introduce GHOST, which uses another way to select the branch. 1. Instead of measuring the length of branches,
GHOST defines the subtree weight to measure the number of blocks in the subtree rooted at each block. For each block,
GHOST regards its child block with maximum subtree weight as the best child and breaks ties by block hash. Started
with the genesis block, GHOST visits the best child recursively to select the branch. GHOST claims that once all the
1Though the structured variants of Nakamoto consensus resolves the throughput issue, GHOST is proposed earlier than their work.
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Figure 1: An example for balance attack.
honest nodes mining under the subtree of one block, the growth of its subtree weight will not be undermined on the
decreasing of block generation interval. Thus GHOST claims it resolves the security issue of Nakamoto consensus in
a high block generation rate (a low block generation interval). However, Sompolinsky et al only analysis the behavior
of GHOST under some attack cases, lack of a rigorous security analysis with a practical result.
Kiayias et al [10] provides a security analysis for GHOST in a low block generation rate under a synchronized
network model. When the block generation rate in GHOST is low enough to matches the requirement in Nakamoto
consensus. GHOST has the same security properties as Nakamoto consensus and can have the same confirmation.
Kiffer et al [11] try to provide a similar analysis under an asynchronized network model.
Liveness attack for GHOST Natoli et al [18] first point out GHOST is vulnerable facing a liveness attack when the
block generation rate is high. The liveness attack is not aimed to re-ordering the confirmed blocks, but tries to prevent
from confirming the new blocks.
They provide a liveness attack strategy called the balance attack. Suppose the total block generation rate is λ and
the attacker is able to delay the message communication with time d. The attacker splits the honest miner into two
groups with similar mining power. Figure 1 presents one example of such attacks. The example has the following
settings: 1) the total block generation rate of honest participants is λ; 2) honest participants are divided into two groups
with equal computation power (group X and group Y in Figure 1); 3) blocks will transmit instantly inside each group,
but the propagation between these two groups has a delay of d. In Figure 1, each of the two groups extend their own
subtree following the GHOST rule. Note that recent generated blocks within the time period of d are in-transit blocks
(gray blocks in Figure 1), which are only visible by the group that generates it. Therefore each group will believe
its own subtree is larger until one group generates sufficiently more blocks than the other to overcome the margin
caused by the in-transit blocks. In normal scenarios, one of the two groups will get lucky to enable the blockchain to
converge. However, an attacker can mine under two subtrees simultaneously to delay the convergence. The attacker
can strategically withhold or release the mined blocks to maintain the balance of the two subtrees as shown in Figure 1.
Previous work has shown that, if the margin caused by in-transit blocks is significant, i.e., λd > 1, an attacker with
little computation power can stall the consensus progress [25].
DAG-based structures To improve the throughput and the confirmation speed, researchers have explored several
alternative structures to organize blocks. Inclusive blockchain [13] extends the Nakamoto consensus and GHOST to
DAG and specifies a framework to include off-chain transactions. In PHANTOM [23], participating nodes first find
an approximate k-cluster solution for its local block DAG to prune potentially malicious blocks. They then obtain
a total order via a topological sort of the remaining blocks. Unfortunately, when the block generation rate is high,
inclusive blockchain and PHANTOM are all vulnerable to liveness attacks. Unlike GHAST they cannot achieve both
the security and the high performance.
Some protocols attempt to obtain partial orders instead of total orders for payment transactions. SPECTRE [22]
produces a non-transitive partial order for all pairs of blocks in the DAG. Avalanche [1] connects raw transactions
into a DAG and uses an iterative random sampling algorithm to determine the acceptance of each transaction. Unlike
GHAST, it is very difficult to support smart contracts on these protocols without total orders.
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Byzantine fault tolerance. ByzCoin [12] and Thunderella [21] propose to achieve consensus by combining the
Nakamoto consensus with Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) protocols. Algorand [8], HoneyBadger [16], and Stel-
lar [15] replace the Nakamoto consensus entirely with BFT protocols. In practice, all these proposals run BFT pro-
tocols within a confined group of nodes, since BFT protocols only scale up to dozens of nodes. The confined group
is often chosen based on their recent PoW computation power [12, 21], their stakes of the system [8], or external
hierarchy of trusts [15, 16].
However, these approaches may create undesirable hierarchies among participants and compromise the decentral-
ization of blockchain systems. Moreover, all of these approaches except Algorand are also vulnerable to DDoS attacks
adaptively targeting those leader or committee nodes. Algorand is vulnerable to long range attacks — an attacker
could use a set of old private keys that once hold the majority of coins to create an alternative transaction history that
is indistinguishable from the real history for new nodes.
2 Model
We adapt round-based partial synchronous network model similar to [19]. A blockchain protocol is defined as a pair
of algorithms (Π~η(1κ), C) with security parameter κ. Π~η is parameterized by a list of protocol parameters ~η(κ) and
we use Π when the context is clear. It maintains the local state B consists of a set of blocks and prepares new blocks
to be resolved proof-of-work puzzle. C orders the blocks in B deterministically.
The model is directed by an environment Z(1κ) with security parameter κ which interacts with an adversary A
and a set of participant nodes N activated by Z . N contains two types of nodes: the honest nodes which follow the
blockchain protocol (Π, C) and the corrupted nodes which are controlled by adversary A. There is a random function
H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}κ which can be accessed by participant nodes via four oracles H(x) := H(x), H.ver(x, y) :=
[H(x) = y], Hweight(x) and Htimer(x). (Hweight and Htimer are used to assign each block two random tags. ) The
output of H is interpreted as an integer in [0, 2κ − 1]. Each node (honest or corrupted) is allowed to query oracle H
once each round.
Round-based execution This protocol proceeds in round to model an atomic time steps (e.g. 10−12 seconds). For
convenience in the security analysis, we re-order the actions of participants and divide them into four phases:
• Phase 1: A corrupts and uncorrupts arbitrary nodes in N . It means A can switch the corrupted nodes set
adaptively between rounds.
• Phase 2: A delivers blocks to each node. Z delivers other messages (e.g. the contents to be recorded on
blockchain) to each node.
• Phase 3(a): For honest nodes, they maintain the local state with input delivered byA and Z in phase 2, organize
a block to be solved proof-of-work puzzle following Π and try to solve the puzzle by querying oracle H. If an
honest node constructs a valid block, it delivers to A and incorporates the new block into its local state.
• Phase 3(b): For corrupted nodes, A gets access to their local state and takes control of access for oracle H,
meaning that adversary is allowed to query oracle H with quota the number of corrupted nodes.
Let random variable View(Π,C)(Z,A, κ) denote the joint view of all the participant nodes and the adversary in all
rounds.
Block and graph A block b is a tuple of (h−1,~h,m, s, h), where h−1 is a hash value (κ-bits string) of a previous
block (a pointer to this block), ~h is a list of hash values to some other blocks, m represents the contents and metadata
carried by such block and s is a nonce. h is the hash of block b satisfyingH(h−1,~h,m, s). We use b.digest to denote
the hash h. The blocks corresponding to h−1 or the hash values in ~h are called direct dependency blocks of block b.
Following the dependency relation recursively, the other reached blocks are called indirect dependency blocks.
In order to limit the generation rate of blocks, Π~η only accepts the block whose hash is smaller than 2κ/ηd, where
ηd is the puzzle difficulty parameter in ~η. In phase 3(a), an honest node following protocol Π~η checks the validity
of incoming blocks and incorporate the valid blocks into local state B. After that, it prepares a new block in format
of (h−1,~h,m,⊥,⊥) directed by protocol Π~η. The proof-of-work puzzle refers finding an appropriate nonce s with
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H(h−1,~h,m, s) < 2κ/ηd to make this block valid. The only way to solve puzzle is querying H with random s via
oracle H. When an appropriate s is found, we say a block is generated.
Protocol Π regards a block as valid if its first component h−1 is not ⊥, its hash value is consistent with other
components and it solves the proof-of-work puzzle. The genesis block g := (⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥,H(⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥)) is a special
valid block which does not satisfy these properties.
A set of valid blocksBwill be regarded as a valid graph if for each block b ∈ B, its direct and indirect dependency
blocks are in B. Since the hash value is unpredictable before querying H, we can simply claim H must output the
hash of block b later than all its direct and indirect dependency blocks. So there should be no cycle in B. The local
state B is a valid graph B and we use B and B interchangeably. The following part only focuses on the valid blocks
and valid graphs. So we omit term “valid” for succinctness.
The blocks constructed by honest nodes are called honest blocks and the blocks constructed by adversary are called
malicious blocks. In our execution model, honest nodes are not informed whether a block is honest or malicious.
Adversary restriction We discuss the model with a restricted environment and adversary.
Definition 2.1 (Admissible environment) We say that the tuple (m(·), β, d(·),A,Z) is admissible w.r.t. (Π, C) if
β < 1/2,A andZ are non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms,m(·) and d(·) are polynomial functions,
and for every κ ∈ N
• Z activates m = m(κ) participant nodes;
• A does not modify the contents of delivered message;
• A always corrupts β ·m(κ) corrupted nodes at the same time. 2
• For any block b, if it appears in local state of one honest node in round r, A is responsible to make sure all the
honest nodes incorporate b to the local states at and after phase 2 of round r + d(κ).
Metrics Here we discuss the aim of our protocol (Π, C). Recalling that random variable View(Π,C)(Z,A, κ) denote
the joint view of all the participant nodes in all rounds. The randomness is from the oracle H(·) and random coins in
Z,A and participant nodes. Let Ur collect all the local states of honest nodes in round r (in each phase). Similar with
[2], the protocol executes for a finite round rmax polynomial in κ.
Our study focus on the finality of block history. The history of block b in local state B refers the prefix 3 of C(B)
ended at block b, which is denoted by Prefix(C(B),b). If b /∈ C(B), Prefix(C(B),b) = ⊥. Block b is finalized
(or confirmed) if all the honest nodes have consistent history of block b remain unchanged. Formally, we define
(ε,A,Z, r0, κ)-finalized as follows.
Definition 2.2 (Finalization) Let Br denote the joint local state of all the honest nodes at round r (after phase 2) in
View(Π,C)(Z,A, κ). Round rcon is (ε,A,Z, r0, κ)-finalized w.r.t. protocol (Π, C) iff
Pr
View(Π,C)(Z,A,κ)
[
∀b ∈ Brcon ,
∣∣∣∣∣⋃r∈{r0,··· ,rmax}B∈Ur Prefix(C(B),b)
∣∣∣∣∣ = 1
]
≥ 1− ε− negl(κ)
Since the local state of each honest node is a random variable, the finality is defined over a round rcon other than a
block b.
Definition 2.3 (Latency) If there exists rε such that for any rcon ≤ rmax − rε, round rcon is (ε,A,Z, rcon + rε, κ)-
finalized, then we say View(Π,C)(Z,A, κ) has the ε-latency rε.
2We assume β ·m(κ) always be an integer here. This setting also handle the case that adversaryA corrupts nodes less than bβ ·m(κ)c, because
adversaryA can make some corrupted nodes act like an honest node.
3In this paper, a prefix of a list could equal to the list itself.
9
3 PROTOCOL
3 Protocol
3.1 Rephrase GHOST protocol in our framework
GHOST proposed in [24] takes a set of blocks in a tree structure as input and outputs a sequence of blocks. Each block
in this tree has a non-negative subtree weight. For every block b, the subtree weight of b refers to the total weights of
all blocks in the subtree rooted at b. The GHOST starts from the root of the tree and repeatedly proceeds to the child
block with maximum subtree weight until reaching a leaf node block. Then the path of blocks will be the chain output
by GHOST.
Now, we formalize the GHOST [24] with our notations. Each block under GHOST doesn’t have the component
of block hash values list. They can be represent by b = (h−1,⊥,m, s, h). The genesis block g is the root of tree in
GHOST. For any other valid block b, h−1 should be the digest of a valid predecessor block b−1, which is called parent
block of b. Since two different blocks never have the same digest with negligible exception, we denote the parent block
by b.parent. (For genesis block, g.parent = ⊥.) Started at any block, following the parent block recursively gives a
chain of blocks ended as the genesis block. Every two consecutive blocks in this chain have a parent/child relation. It
is called chain of block b and defined as
Chain(b) :=
{
b b = g
Chain(b.parent) ◦ b otherwise (1)
In a graph B, each block has exactly one outgoing edge except the genesis block with no outgoing edge and there
is no cycle because of unpredictable of digest computation. So all the blocks organize in a tree rooted at g. We use
SubT(B,b) to denote the subtree rooted at block b in B.
SubT(B,b) := {b′ ∈ B : b′ ∈ Chain(b)}. (2)
The subtree weight for each block b ∈ B refers the total block weight of blocks SubT(B,b). In GHOST protocol,
all the blocks have the same weight 1 (∀b ∈ B,b.weight = 1) 4 and the subtree weight is formulated as
SubTW(B,b) =
∑
b′∈SubT(B,b)
b′.weight. (3)
The children of block b refers all the blocks b′ which regard b as its parent block. In addition, we filters out
the blocks with weight 0. This rule is not activated in GHOST protocol since all the block have weight 1. But the
following design will introduce zero-weight block.
Chldn(B,b) := {b′ ∈ B : b′.parent = b ∧ b′.weight > 0}. (4)
Among all the children block, GHOST chooses the one with the largest subtree weight and break tie by choosing
the block with minimum block hash. Formally, it can be described by
BestChild(B,b) := arg max
b′∈Chldn(B,b)
SubTW(B,b′). (5)
(Note: 1. When Chldn(B,b) = ∅, let BestChild(B,b) = ⊥; 2. When there are multiple children having maximum
subtree weight, this function breaks tie by returning the block with minimum block digest. 5)
4A blockchain system uses puzzle difficulty as block weight. Since our model has a static puzzle difficulty, we simply set block weight be 1.
5The original work [24] didn’t mention how to break ties when two subtree have the same weight. However, breaking tie with block digest is a
common setting in previous work. [19]
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Started with the genesis block g, GHOST recursively choose the best child until reaching a block without children.
All reached blocks organize a chain called pivot chain of graph B. Pivot(B) is defined formally in figure 1.
Input : A graph B
Output: A sequence of blocks L
1 Initialize L with empty list
2 Initialize b with genesis block g
3 L←− L ◦ b
4 while Child(B,b) 6= ∅ do
5 b←− BestChild(B,b)
6 L←− L ◦ b
7 return L
Figure 2: The definition of Pivot(B).
Now we describe the protocol (Π~ηGHOST, CGHOST). Π~η first initiates the local state of all participant nodes with
genesis block g. In phase 3(a) of each round, upon receiving the blocks delivered by adversary A, Π~ηGHOST directs
the honest nodes check their validity and append them into B while making sure B be valid. Then each honest node
computes the pivot chain by Pivot(B) over their local state B, sets h−1 be the digest of last block in Pivot(B),
prepares block bnew = (h−1,⊥,m,⊥,⊥) and tries to solve proof-of-work puzzle by querying H(h−1,⊥,m, s) with
random s. After that, the model enters phase 4. In ordering the graph B, order algorithm CGHOST(B) simply returns
the pivot chain of local state Pivot(B).
3.2 Tree-graph structure
We adopt the ideas from previous works [22, 23] which allow each block refers multiple predecessor blocks and
organize blocks in the structure of directed acyclic graph instead of tree. A valid blocks can be represented by b =
(h−1,~h,m, s, h), in which ~h contains a list of digests (pointers) of other valid blocks. The blocks pointed by ~h are
called reference blocks of b. (Genesis block g should have empty ~h). Started with block b, by following the reference
blocks repeatedly, we can reach all the direct and indirect dependency blocks of b. These blocks (not including block
b) organize a valid graph, which is called the past graph of block b and denoted by b.past.
The parent block digest h−1 of all blocks organizes blocks in a tree structure and the reference block digests ~h
organize blocks in a directed acyclic graph structure. So we call it Tree-graph structure and denote the protocol by
(Π~ηTG, CTG). Compared with Π~ηGHOST, Π~ηTG has an additional requirement for block validity. It requires a valid block
b chooses the pivot chain tip of b.past as its parent block. So the chain of block b is consistent with the pivot chain
in graph b.past. (a.k.a. Pivot(b.past) ◦ b = Chain(b).) In organizing new blocks bnew = (h−1,~h,m,⊥,⊥) to be
solved proof-of-work puzzle, Π~ηTG prepares h−1 and m in the same way as Π
~η
GHOST, and includes the digests of tip
blocks in graph B into ~h to make sure bnew.past = B.
The ordering algorithm CTG is defined formally in figure 3. It initializes a list L with only genesis block g and
visits the blocks in the pivot chain sequentially. In each round, when the algorithm CTG reaches block bnext with parent
block b, it collects all the blocks in b.past but not appended to L in the last round (not in b.past ∪ {b}), topological
sorts them with a deterministic function TopoSort(·) and appends the result to L. Next the algorithm appends bnext
to L and continues to visit the next block. The detailed implementation of function TopoSort(·) is not necessary in
subsequent analysis.
3.3 GHAST
Now we introduce the Ghast protocol (Π~ηGHAST, CGHAST). It is the same as (Π~ηTG, CTG) except the definition of block
weight. In (Π~ηGHAST, CGHAST), the protocol may assign different block weight to each block in order to solve the
liveness issues in Ghost. 6 The following design requires four more parameters in ~η: ηw, ηa, ηt and ηb.
6This design is totally different from the mechanism called difficulty adjustment in Bitcoin. Difficulty adjustment mechanism changes the block
weights and puzzle difficulty in react to the change of computing power (the frequency in querying oracle H). In the safety analysis model with
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Input : A valid graph B (An alias of local state B)
Output: A sequence of blocks L
1 P←− Pivot(B)
2 b←− Pull the first block from P
3 Assert b is genesis block g
4 L←− b
5 while P is not empty list do
6 bnext ←− Pull the first block from P
7 L←− L ◦ TopoSort(bnext.past\ ({b} ∪ b.past))
8 L←− L ◦ bnext
9 b←− bnext
10 return L
Figure 3: The definition of CTG(B).
3.3.1 Assign block weight accordingly
Previous work [25] figures out an adversary with a low computing power in ratio (e.g. β = 0.2) has the ability to
defer the finality of a block when the block generation interval (m/ηd rounds in average) is much smaller than the
maximum message delay (d rounds). In order to solve this problem, we propose a structured GHOST protocol which
slows down the weighted block generation rate. We assign each block b = (h−1,~h,m, s, h) a random tag computed
by oracle Hweight(h) := H(weight, h) where weight represents a fixed bit-string to make Hweight(h) be independent
with the outputs from H in solving proof-of-work puzzle. Let ηw > 0 be a parameter which specifies the ratio in
slowing down generation rate. We set b.weight = ηw when Hweight(h) < 2κ/ηw and b.weight = 0 otherwise. It
means that a valid block will be assigned with weight ηw with probability 1/ηw. Thus the generation rate of the blocks
with non-zero weight reduces ηw times.
When the block generation rate is low enough to solve issues in Ghost, the confirmation latency is as worse as
nakamoto consensus. So the protocol switch between an optimistic consensus strategy and a conservative strategy
accordingly. In the optimistic strategy, all the blocks have the same weight 1. When the protocol detects a serious
attack happens, it switches to the conservative strategy in which only 1/ηw of blocks is assigned weight ηw.
In a partial synchronous network, it is impossible to make all the honest nodes switch the settings simultaneously.
So the protocol determines the consensus strategy for each block individually and incorporates the blocks generated in
two strategies into one Tree-Graph. We set a deterministic function Adapt(B) which is responsible for detecting the
presence of a liveness in a local state B. It takes the past-set of a block as input and outputs opt or con to indicate the
consensus strategy for this block. For the blockbwith Adapt(b.past) = opt, b.weight = 1. If Adapt(b.past) = con,
the block weight equals to 0 or ηw depending onHweight(h).
3.3.2 Detect liveness attack
Function Adapt(·) is parameterized by a positive integer ηa in ~η. We define a concept called ηa−dominant child. In
a given graph B, when block b has a child block b′ whose subtree weight is at least ηa larger than the subtree weight
of the other blocks, we say block b′ is ηa−dominant child of block b in graph B. Specially, if block b has only one
child block, the subtree weight of its ηa−dominant child block should be at least ηa. Function Adapt(·) starts with
the genesis block g, visits the ηa−dominant child repeatedly until reaching a block without ηa−dominant child. Let
block bc be the last visited block.
For another graphB′, if the total block weight of symmetric difference between graphB and graphB′ is less than
ηa, the pivot chain of B and graph B′ must have the common prefix ended at bc. Intuitively, for another honest node
whose local state is not much different from B, it should also agree that block bc is in pivot chain.
After getting the chain ended at bc, function Adapt(·) accesses a block age speculation function Old(B,b). (It
is defined in 3.3.3.) It conjectures whether a block b is old enough (has been generated for a sufficient long time) at
the time point that an honest node has local graph B. If Old(B,bc) output False, we have relative high confidence
constant computing power, Bitcoin and some other protocols like Ghost and Prism [2] doesn’t adjust the puzzle difficulty and block weight. But
Ghast protocol may assign different block weight to each block.
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that honest nodes have almost the same pivot chain and there is no liveness issue. So Adapt(B) outputs opt when
Old(B,bc) = False and outputs con otherwise.
The block age speculation function is required the following two properties:
1. If a block is old enough, all the blocks in its past set should also be old enough. Formally, for any block b,b′
and graph B with Old(B,b) = True and b′ ∈ b.past, it should be Old(B,b′) = True.
2. Once a block becomes old enough, it will always be old enough in the future. Formally, for any graph B,B′
and block b with Old(B,b) = True and B ⊆ B′, it will be Old(B′,b) = True.
Now we give a formal definition for function Adapt(·). Let SibSubTW(B,b) returns the maximum subtree
weight of the siblings of b (the other children of its parent block).
SibSubTW(B,b) := max
b′∈Chldn(B,b.parent)\{b}
SubTW(B,b′). (6)
(If Chldn(B,b.parent)\{b} is empty set, SibSubTW(B,b) returns 0.)
Notice that b is the ηa−dominant child iff SubTW(B,b)− SibSubTW(B,b) ≥ ηa. The function Adapt(·) can
be expressed in an equivalent form:
Definition 3.1 Function Adapt(B) outputs con if one of the following two conditions satisfied:
• ∃b ∈ PivotChain(B),Old(B,b.parent) = True ∧ SubTW(B,b)− SibSubTW(B,b) < ηa.
• For the last block b′ in PivotChain(B), Old(B,b′) = True
For other cases, Adapt(B) outputs opt. Specially, if B = ∅, Adapt(B) outputs opt. The function Old(B,b) is
defined in definition 3.2.
3.3.3 Block age speculation function
Block age speculation function Old(B,b) parameterized by ηt, ηb conjectures if a block has been generated for a long
enough time when an honest node see graphB. Let graphB be the local state of an honest node at round r. Informally,
we want to achieve two properties with some integers r2 < r1:
• If block b is generated by an honest node, Old(B,b) outputs True if b is generated before round r − r1 and
outputs False if b is generated later than r − r2 (with negligible exception).
• If block b is generated by adversary, Old(B,b) outputs True if b is generated before round r − r1 (with
negligible exception).
Note that we allow Old(B,b) to falsely think a newly generated malicious block has been withheld for a long
time. Because in some attack cases, an honest node can not distinguish between a newly generated block and an old
block. For example, the adversary generates block b1 when the blockchain system just launched, withholds block b1
for a long time, and then generates another block b2 with the same parent blocks and direct dependency blocks. Then
block b1 and block b2 have the same past set and difference block age.
We start with an idea that the protocol runs another blockchain under nakamoto consensus [17] as timer chain. The
previous work [19] shows that the longest branch in nakamoto consensus excluding last x blocks will be agreed by all
the honest nodes (except with exponentially small probability in x), and the growth rate on chain length has a lower
bound and an upper bound. So the timer chain excluding last several blocks grows steadily and never be reverted.
A block in tree graph structure can indicate its earliest possible generation time by including a block hash in timer
chain. Counting the block height difference between the included block and the newest block in the timer chain, we
can speculate the age of a block.
The timer chain is constructed by picking a sequence of blocks in tree-graph structure. Formally, we assign each
block b = (h−1,~h,m, s, h) another random tag computed by oracle Htimer(h) := H(timer, h). The blocks with
Htimer(h) < ηt · 2κ are called timer blocks. Let Timer(B) denote all the timer blocks in B. For each timer block b,
we defines its height in timer chain as
TimerHeight(b) := max
b′∈Timer(b.past)
TimerHeight(b′) + 1. (7)
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Specially, if b.past has no timer block, let TimerHeight(b) = 1. For a graph B, MaxTM(B) returns maximum
timer height.
MaxTH(B) := max
b′∈Timer(B)
TimerHeight(b′). (8)
Definition 3.2 (Block age speculation function) Given graph B and block b, Old(B,b) outputs True iff
MaxTH(B)− TimerHeight(b) ≥ ηb.
Note that function Old(B,b) is also well-defined even if b /∈ B,
3.3.4 Summary for the GHAST protocol
Formally, the protocol (ΠGHAST, CGHAST) is the same as (ΠTG, CTG) excepts the way in assigning block weights. Given
function Adapt(B) defined in definition 3.1, the block weights in the GHAST protocol is defined as
b.weight :=

1 Adapt(B) = opt
ηw Adapt(B) = con ∧Hweight(b.digest) < 2κ/ηw
0 Adapt(B) = con ∧Hweight(b.digest) ≥ 2κ/ηw
(9)
4 Security
Now we analysis the security of Ghast protocol. Formally, given ~η := (ηd, ηw, ηa, ηt, ηb), we analysis the finalization
for (m,β, d,A,Z) which is admissible w.r.t. (Π~ηGHAST, CGHAST).
4.1 Skeleton of proofs
We let the adversary A maintains an additional adversary state S for security analysis only. The adversary state is
updated only on the following four types of events:
• Honest block generation (denoted by hGenRls). An honest node constructs a valid block b, incorporates it into
local state and sends it to adversary A.
• Malicious block generation (denoted by mGen). The adversary constructs a valid block b.
• Malicious block release (denoted by mRls). For a block b constructed by the adversary, the first time it appears
in the local state of an honest node.
• Block received by all honest nodes (denoted by Arvl). If a block b is incorporated to the local state of an honest
node at round r, an event happens at round r + d which guarantees block b appears the local state of all the
honest nodes after this time.
We use a tuple e := (r,b, t) with t ∈ {hGenRls,mGen,mRls,Arvl} to denote a type t event happens at round r
corresponding to block b. A function ψ(S−1, e) = S directs adversary updates S−1 to S when event e happens.
We define a global potential value P˜ (S,B) to quantify the adversary’s power in changing the history of blocks in
B. We show that the history of blocks in B will be consistent among all the honest participants become unchangeable
unless P˜ (S,B) larger than a threshold in the future in theorem 4.7. In other words, for any graph B, the finalization
of blocks in graph B can be reduced to the upper bound for P˜ (S,B).
We impose an event value on every events to upper bound its influence on global potential value. (Theorem 4.9.)
The sum of event values naturally implies an upper bound for the global potential value. So the finalization property
can be derived from the random variable for the sum of event values.
We will introduce the intuitions in designing adversary state update functionψ(S−1, e), potential function P˜ (S,B),
and event value in section 4.2. Then we will define these functions formally in section 4.3. It is inconsistent with the
intuition in some details since the intuitions are illustrative. Section 4.4 proves that our design achieves our aim in
proof skeleton.
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4.2 Intuitions
Common pivot chain Recalling that the ordering algorithm CGHAST(B) is the same as CTG(B) except the definition
of block weight. From the definition of CTG(B) in figure 3, the block order is only determined by the pivot chain
Pivot(B). (We use B and B interchangeably.) Given two graphs B1,B2, if block b appears in the pivot chain of
graphB1 and graphB2, block b and the blocks in its past-set b.past must have the same history in graphB1 andB2.
Because the execution of CTG(B1) and CTG(B2) are the same before block b appended to L. So the history of a block
will remain unchanged if it is kept in the pivot chain.
A pivot chain block b will be kept in the pivot chain only if its subtree weight is always no less than the its sibling
blocks. We notice that when all the honest nodes are trying to construct block in the subtree of block b, the subtree
weight of b will increase faster than all its siblings in expectation, no matter what adversary A does. To study this
case, we define common pivot chain which refers the intersection of the local state pivot chains of all honest nodes. As
long as a block b lies on the common pivot chain, all the newly generated honest blocks will fall into the subtree of b
and contribute to the subtree weight of b. So block b will accumulate subtree weight advantages compared to siblings
blocks. Intuitively, if a block b can stay in a common pivot chain for a sufficient long time, block b will be finalized.
Special status Some known attack can make the honest nodes disagree on choosing the best child for an old pivot
chain block. In section 3.1, we try to handle this attack by switching to a conservative setting. Here, we want all the
honest nodes switch to the conservative setting when the last block of common pivot chain is old enough. Formally,
let P be the common pivot chain, btip be the last block of the common pivot chain, B be the local state of an honest
node. We want Adapt(B) = con when Old(B,btip) = True.
Let btipc be the next block in Pivot(B). (btipc = ⊥ if btipc is the last block in Pivot(B).) By definition 3.1,
when Old(B,btip) = True, Adapt(B) = con if SubTW(B,btipc) − SibSubTW(B,btipc) < ηa or btipc = ⊥. For
the case btipc 6= ⊥, since btipc is not in the pivot chain, there exists local state B′ of another honest node satisfying
SubTW(B′,btipc) − SibSubTW(B′,btipc) ≤ 0. Let T include blocks which are in subtree of btip and have been
received by only a part of honest nodes. Let w be the total block weight in T. The total block weight of symmetric
difference between SubTW(B,btip) and SubTW(B′,btip) is at most w. If w < ηa, we have
SubTW(B,btipc)− SibSubTW(B,btipc) ≤ w + SubTW(B′,btipc)− SibSubTW(B′,btipc) < ηa.
So we can guarantee Adapt(B) = con if Old(B,btip) = True and w < ηa. For the case w ≥ ηa, we can’t provide
such a guarantee. We define such case as special status.
Let wh and wm denote the total weight of honest blocks and malicious blocks inT. So w = wh +wm. wh is upper
bounded by the total weight of honest blocks generated in the past d rounds. All honest nodes generate (1−β)·n·ηd/2κ
block weight per round in average. So we can find an threshold ξ such that wh ≥ ξ with a low probability. So if the
adversary wants to trigger special status, it needs to release blocks in subtree of btip with total weight at least ηa − ξ
in consecutive d rounds.
Block potential value For each block b in the common pivot chain, we introduce a block potential value P (S,b) to
quantify the ability of adversary in changing or choosing the next common pivot chain block b. Given round number
r, if there exists a block br in the common pivot chain and br.past contains all the blocks released no later than r.
If we want to keep br in the common pivot chain, for each block in Chain(br.parent), the adversary should not be
able to change its next common pivot chain block. We set global potential value P˜r(S) the maximum block potential
values of blocks in Chain(br.parent).
Event value Recalling that we impose event values to upper bounds event influence on global potential value. The
random variable for the sum of event values is relevant to block finalization.
Noticing that solving the proof-of-work puzzle is essentially a Markov process. Given r1 ≤ r2, whether a hGenRls
event or mGen event happens in round r2 is independent with events before round r1 and adversary strategies. Since
block generation time cannot be manipulated, the attackers strategy becomes almost transparent when only looking
at block generation events. Therefore, we only impose non-zero event values on block generation events to skim
complicate adversary strategies. Usually, hGenRls events have negative values and mGen events have positive values.
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The event values also depend on the background when such event happens. (For example, whether such event happens
in special status.)
4.3 Concepts
Notations We define some tool functions and notations used in the following discussion. For any set of blocks T
, TotalW(T) :=
∑
b∈T b.weight returns the total weight of blocks in T. For any two blocks b1,b2 in graph B,
b1 ∈ Chain(b2) is equivalent to b2 ∈ SubT(B,b1) according to notations in section 3.1. We denote their relation
by b1  b2. If furthermore there is b1 6= b2, then we write b1 ≺ b2. If C is a chain of blocks in which the adjacent
blocks have parent/child relation, we use Tip(C) to denote the last block inC, and use Next(C,b) to denote the next
element (child block) of block b in C. Specially, if b = Tip(C) or b /∈ C, Next(C,b) returns ⊥. We emphasize
that the function SubT(B,b) and SubTW(B,b) are well-defined when B is only a subset of valid blocks other than
a valid graph. For event e = (r,b, t), we use e.block to denote block b.
4.3.1 Adversary State
The adversary state S is a tuple of
(Bgen,Bmax,Bmin,B∆,M, f ,C,S, v).
Bgen,Bmax and Bmin are three graphs, which include all the generated blocks, all the released blocks (the blocks
whose mRls or hGenRls event has happened) and all the blocks released d rounds before (the blocks whose Arvl event
has happened). B∆ := Bmax\Bmin denotes the blocks which may be received by only a part of honest nodes. M is
a set of malicious blocks in Bgen, so we can distinguish the honest block and malicious blocks. S and v are a set of
blocks and a real number relevant to special status. f is the flag block. It equals to ⊥ to represents there is no flag
block. C is a variant of common pivot chain. It will be formally defined later.
For convenient, symbols Bgen, Bmax, Bmin, B∆, M, f , C, S, and v denote corresponding components of S. The
symbols with subscript denote components of adversary state with the same subscript in the context. For example,
Bmax−1 denotes the first component of S−1. For event e = (r,b, t), we use e.round, e.block and e.type to denote its
three components.
Traverse function ψ(S−1, e) = S updates S−1 to S when an event e happens. ψ is parameterized by two non-
negative integers sm, sh, which is for security analysis only. sm and sh satisfy 2sh + 2sm ≤ ηw. . The following part
introduces how the traverse function maintain each component of the adversary state.
The first five sets Bgen,Bmax andBmin are initiated with a set with genesis block {g}. M is initiated with an empty
set. Upon event e happens, Bgen−1 , B
max
−1 , B
min
−1 and M−1 are updated to B
gen, Bmax, Bmin and M according to e.type.
• hGenRls event: add e.block to Bgen−1 and B
max
−1
• mGen event: add e.block to Bgen−1 and M−1
• mRls event: add e.block to Bmax−1
• Arvl event: add e.block to Bmin−1
Then we set B∆ = Bmax\Bmin.
Bmax includes all the blocks appears in the local state of an honest node, and the blocks inBmin must appear in the
local state of all the honest nodes in an admissible environment (by definition 2.1). Thus we can claim an honest node
local state B must always be Bmin ⊆ B ⊆ Bmax. Since all the blocks are added to Bgen when it is generated, there
must be Bmax ⊆ Bgen.
Claim 4.1 For any adversary state S appearing in the execution of ghast protocol, and any honest node local state B
at the same time, there must be Bmin ⊆ B ⊆ Bmax ⊆ Bgen.
Speical status The special status function Spe(B∆,C) outputs True or False to indicate whether S is in special
status. Spe(S) represents Spe(B∆,C) in case we don’t care about which components are accessed. The special status
is defined as follows.
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Definition 4.2 (Special Status) Given B∆ and chain C, Spe(B∆,C) returns True if one of the following three con-
ditions satisfied:
1. SubT
(
B∆ ∩M,Tip(C)) ≥ sm
2. |{b ∈ B∆\M | b.weight = 1} | ≥ sh
3. |{b ∈ B∆\M | b.weight = ηw} | ≥ 3
Flag block The flag block f is a block in Bmax or equals to ⊥ representing no flag block. It is initiated with ⊥.
Given adversary state S−1 and event e, traverse function updates f−1 by the following rules:
1. If e.block.weight = ηw, e.type = hGenRls, Spe(S−1) = False, and B∆−1\M−1 has no block with block weight
ηw, then f = e.block.
2. If e.block.weight = ηw, e.type = hGenRls and f−1 6= ⊥, then f = ⊥.
3. If e.block = f−1 6= ⊥ and e.type = Arvl, then f = ⊥.
4. For other cases, let f = f−1.
The definition shows that a block can only become a flag block when it is generated, and it is no longer a flag block
when its Arvl event happens. So a flag block f must be in B∆.
Claim 4.3 For any adversary state S appearing in the execution of ghast protocol, if f 6= ⊥, f must be an honest
block in B∆ with block weight ηw.
Variant of common pivot chain The chain C is defined on Bmax,Bmin, C−1 and f . 7 First, we define function
Adv((Bmax,Bmin, f),b) which provides a lower bound for subtree weight difference between block b and its maxi-
mum sibling blocks in an honest node local state, with the assumption that the flag block (if exists) has been received
by all the honest nodes. Adv((Bmax,Bmin, f),b) can be represented by Adv(S,b) for simplicity.
Adv((Bmax,Bmin, f),b) := SubTW
(
Bmin ∪ {f},b)− SibSubTW(Bmax,b).
Here we regard {⊥} as an empty set because ⊥ presents “no such a block”.
Lemma 4.4 For any two graphs Bmin ⊆ Bmax, let f ∈ B∆ or f = ⊥. For any block b, there exists at most one block
b′ ∈ Chldn(Bmax,b) with Adv((Bmax,Bmin, f),b′) > 0.
The previous lemma shows that every blocks will have at most one child block b′ with Adv((Bmax,Bmin, f),b′) >
0. It is proved in appendix A.2. Based on this property, we specifies the rule in updating C−1. C is initiated with a
genesis block g. Given Bmax and Bmin, C−1 is updated in the following steps:
1. Started with the genesis block, we recursively visit its child block b in graph Bmax which satisfies
Adv((Bmax,Bmin, f),b) > 0, until we reach a block without such child block. These blocks organize the chain
C.
2. If there is a block b′ ∈ C satisfying Tip(C−1) ≺ b′ and Adv((Bmax,Bmin, f),b′) ≤ sm + sh, we cut off the
suffix started with b′ from C.
So we have the following claims for chain C.
Claim 4.5 For any adversary state S−1 appearing in the blockchain protocol execution, and let S = ψ(S−1, e) for
some event e. Let block b be the last block of C and block b−1 be the last block of C−1. We have
1. For any block b′ ∈ C, Adv(S,b′) > 0. Specially, if Tip(C−1) ≺ b′, then Adv(S,b′) > sm + sh.
2. For any block b′ ∈ Chldn(Bmax,Tip(C)), Adv(S,b′) ≤ sm + sh. Specially, if b′  Tip(C−1), then
Adv(S,b′) ≤ 0.
3. For any block bc, if all the block b′ in Chain(bc) satisfying Adv(S,b′) > sm + sh, then bc ∈ C.
7Notice that f depends on Spe(S−1) other than Spe(S). So we don’t have a recursive dependency here.
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The set and value related to special status The set of blocks S and value v are initialized with empty set and 0. S
records all the malicious blocks have been taken into consider in special status. It is defined onBmax,Bmin,C,M and
S−1. Recalling that the special status consider the blocks in T := SubT
(
B∆,Tip(C)
)
. Upon the events happens,
we set S = S−1 ∪ (T ∩M). The value v traces the total block weight in S and increases by up to sm in each update.
Formally, v is initiated by 0 and let v := v−1 + min {sm,TotalW(S\S−1)}. We summarize several properties that
are immediately induced from the definition.
Claim 4.6 For any adversary state S−1 appearing in the blockchain protocol execution, and let S = ψ(S−1, e) for
some event e. Let T := SubT
(
B∆,Tip(C)
)
, we have the following claims
1. S−1 ⊆ S
2. 0 ≤ v − v−1 ≤ sm
3. v − v−1 ≤ TotalW(S)− TotalW(S−1)
4. S\S−1 ⊆ T ∩M ⊆ S.
4.3.2 Potential value
Block potential value Now we provide a formal definition for block potential value over the adversary state defined
above. The block potential value P (S,b) is defined for a single block b over some adversary state S. Formally, the
potential value P (S,b) is ⊥ by default and it is an integer when b is old enough in Bmin and agreed by all honest
nodes, i.e. Old(Bmax,b) = True and b ∈ C. When not being ⊥, the potential value P (S,b) is the summation of
three components Pwith, Padv, Psp defined as follows.
• Pwith(S,b) is the total weight of blocks withheld by adversary under the subtree of b:
Pwith(S,b) := SubTW(Bgen\Bmax,b)
• Padv(S, c) roughly corresponds to the volatility of the pivot child of b. Let c := Next(C,b), N := {b′ ∈
Bmax\M | b′.weight = 1}.
Padv(S, c) :=
{
sh + sm −Adv(S, c)−min{TotalW(SubT
(
B∆, c
) ∩N), sh} c 6= ⊥
0 c = ⊥
• Psp(S,b) + v measures the total cost for triggering the special status. Let c = Next(C,b).
Psp(S,b) :=
{
TotalW((SubT
(
B∆, c
) ∩M)\S) c 6= ⊥
0 c = ⊥
And the potential value for block b is defined as follows
P (S,b) :=
{
Pwith(S,b) + Padv(S,Next(C,b)) + Psp(S,b) b ∈ C ∧Old(Bmin,b) = True
⊥ Otherwise
Global potential value The global potential function P˜ (S,B) is defined on the adversary state S and a graph B.
Given adversary state S and graph B, let C′ := {b ∈ C|B * b.past}. It returns the maximum block potential values
in C′.
P˜ (S,B) := max
b∈C∧B*b.past
P (S,b). (10)
Specially, if C′ is empty set or all the blocks in C′ have a block potential value ⊥, P˜ (S,B) returns 0.
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4.3.3 Event value
In order to upper bound the global potential value P˜ (S,B), we investigate how an event influences the potential and
prove its upper bound by a case-by-case analysis. More specifically, given an event e happens when the adversary
state is S−1, we introduce the event value of e with respect to the adversary state S−1. Formally, the event value of e
is denoted by ∆(S−1, e) and defined as follows:
• If e.type ∈ {mRls,Arvl}, ∆(S−1, e) := 0.
• If e.type = mGen, ∆(S−1, e) := e.block.weight.
• If e.type = hGenRls and e.block.weight = 0, ∆(S−1, e) := 0
• If e.type = hGenRls and e.block.weight = 1, then
∆(S−1, e) :=
{ −1 Spe(S−1) = False
0 Spe(S−1) = True
• If e.type = hGenRls and e.block.weight = ηw, then ∆(S−1, e) is defined as follows
– If B∆−1 doesn’t have an honest block with block weight ηw and Spe(S−1) = False, e.block.weight :=
2sh + 2sm − ηw. (If f = e.block, it must be in this case.)
– If B∆−1 doesn’t have an honest block with block weight ηw and Spe(S−1) = True, e.block.weight := 0.
– If B∆−1 has an honest block with block weight ηw and f−1 = ⊥, e.block.weight := 0.
– If B∆−1 has an honest block with block weight ηw and f−1 6= ⊥, e.block.weight := ηw + sm. (If f−1 6= ⊥
and f = ⊥, it must be in this case.)
(Note that a flag block must be an honest block with block weight ηw and it must belong to B∆−1. So B
∆
−1
doesn’t have an honest block with block weight ηw only if f−1 = ⊥.)
4.4 Properties
Notations Let en denote the nth event since the ghast protocol launched and Sn−1 denote the adversary state when
event en happens. The traverse function ψ(Sn−1, en) = Sn updates Sn−1 to Sn. Variable N(r) denotes the number
of events happens before round r. In other words, the last event before round r is eN(r).
Let δ := 1 − β/(1 − β) and λ := m(d + 1)/ηd. So 1 − δ represents the ratio of computing power between the
honest participants and the adversary, λ approximately represents the expectation of block generated in a maximum
network delay.
All the notations in the previous sub-sections are inherited here.
The proof of theorems are in the appendix.
First, we shows the sufficient conditions for block finalization. Theorem 4.7 shows that the history of blocks in
BminN(r0) will be consistent among all the honest participants and remain unchanged as long as P˜ (S,BminN(r0)) < −ηw
holds and all the blocks b satisfying BminN(r0) * b.past must be old enough. This implies that the analysis for block
finalization can be reduced to the analysis of potential value and “not old enough” blocks.
Theorem 4.7 In execution of ghast protocol, for any r0 and r1, we have
∀b˜ ∈ BminN(r0),
∣∣∣∣∣⋃r∈{r1,r1+1,··· ,rmax}B∈Ur Prefix(CGHAST(B), b˜)
∣∣∣∣∣ = 1
as long as both of the following conditions satisfied for any n > N(r1),
• P˜ (Sn,BminN(r0)) < −ηw
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• For any block b ∈ Bgenn with BminN(r0) * b.past, it will be Old(Bminn ,b) = True.
(Note that Ur collects all the local states of honest nodes in round r.)
We study the difference of the addition of potential value and special value between two adjacent adversary state.
For the block potential value, we have the following theorem. This theorem shows that when the adversary state is
updated from S−1 to S, we provide an upper bound for block potential values except one special case: P (S−1,b) = ⊥,
P (S,b) 6= ⊥ and Old(Bmin−1 ,b) = False.
Theorem 4.8 For any adversary state S appearing in the execution of ghast protocol, let S−1 be the last adversary
state and e be the event updates S−1 to S .
For any block b with P (S−1,b) 6= ⊥ and P (S,b) 6= ⊥, we have
(P (S,b) + v)− (P (S−1,b) + v−1) ≤ ∆(S−1, e).
For any block b with P (S−1,b) = ⊥, P (S,b) 6= ⊥ and Old(Bmin−1 ,b) = True, we have
(P (S,b) + v)− (P (S−1,Tip(C−1)) + v−1) ≤ ∆(S−1, e).
Since the global potential value takes the maximum block potential over a block set, theorem 4.8 derives a similar
property for the global potential value in theorem 4.9.
Theorem 4.9 For any adversary state S appearing in the execution of ghast protocol, let S−1 be the last adversary
state and e be the event updates S−1 to S. For any graph B we have the following inequality
(P˜ (S,B) + v)− (P˜ (S−1,B) + v−1) ≤ ∆(S−1, e)
as long as Old(Bmin−1 ,g) = True for genesis block g and the following holds for every block b ∈ {b′ ∈ C|B *
b′.past},
Old(Bmin,b) = False ∨Old(Bmin−1 ,b) = True ∨ P˜ (S,B) 6= P (S,b)
This theorem shows that when an event e happens, the value of P˜ (S−1,B) + v−1 grows at most the event value
∆(S−1, e). The exceptional case is that a block b just becomes old enough at S and at the same time P˜ (S,b)
determines P˜ (S,B). So for any event index n, let n′ denote the last event triggering the exceptional case. The
global potential value P˜ (Sn,B) is upper bounded by the summation of two terms: 1) the global potential value after
event en′ , a.k.a. P˜ (Sn′ ,B); 2) The summation of event values (removing the influence from special value), a.k.a.∑n
i=n′+1 (∆(Si−1, ei)− (vi − vi−1)). For the first term, theorem 4.10 provides an upper bound. For the second
term, theorem 4.11 show that the summation of tends to negative infinity in a long enough time.
So if we want to prove P˜ (Sn,BminN(r0)) < −ηw for all the sufficient large n, (the first sufficient condition for
block finalization given in theorem 4.7), we only need to show that the exceptional case of theorem 4.9 never happens
after a time point. Recalling that P˜ (Sn,BminN(r0)) takes the maximum block potential weight among blocks with
b.past * BminN(r0). Since theorem 4.12 proves that for all the blocks satisfying b.past * B
min
N(r0)
must be old enough
after a time point, this guarantee that the exceptional case will never happen for BminN(r0) after that. This is also the
second sufficient condition for block finalization.
Theorem 4.10 Given (m,β, d,A,Z) which is admissible w.r.t. (Π~ηGHAST, CGHAST). Let
w(ε) := 4λ ·max
{
140
δ2
· log
(
9000
εδ2
)
,
8(ηb + 4)
δ
}
.
Let B˜r denote all the blocks with Old(BminN(r),b) = False. When λ ≥ 0.8 log(500/δ), ηt = 2λ/δ and ηw = 30λ/δ,
for any r2 ≥ 0 and ε > 0, we have
Pr
[
∃N(r2) < n ≤ N(r2 + 1),∃b ∈ B˜r2 , P (Sn,b) ≥ w(ε)
]
≤ ε.
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Theorem 4.11 Given (m,β, d,A,Z) which is admissible w.r.t. (Π~ηGHAST, CGHAST). When λ ≥ 0.8 log(500/δ) and
ηw = 30λ/δ, for any round r1 < r2, ρ > 0 and ε > 0, if
r2 − r1
d+ 1
≥ max
{
(3 + ρ/ηw) · 600
δ2
, log
(
4
ε
)
· 3000
δ3
, log
(
404
ε
)
· 200
δ
}
,
we have
Pr
∀r2, N(r2)∑
i=N(r1)+1
∆(Si−1, ei)−
(
vN(r2) − vN(r1)
) ≥ −ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣Viewr1
 ≤ ε.
(Let Viewr denote the joint view in View
(ΠGHAST,CGHAST)(Z,A, κ) before round r. )
Theorem 4.12 Given (m,β, d,A,Z) which is admissible w.r.t. (Π~ηGHAST, CGHAST). When β ≥ 0.1, ηt ≥ 2λ/δ and
r∆ satisfying
r∆ ≥ ηtηd
m
·max
{
128
δ2
· log
(
8400
εδ2
)
,
8(ηb + 2)
δ
}
for any r, we have
Pr
[
∃n ≥ N(r + r∆),∃b ∈ Bgenn ,BminN(r) * b.past ∧Old(Bminn ,b) = False
]
≤ ε.
Summarize all the previous proofs, finally we gives the finalization properties of the GHAST protocol under any
possible attack strategies.
Theorem 4.13 Given (m,β, d,A,Z) which is admissible w.r.t. (Π~ηGHAST, CGHAST). When β ≥ 0.1, λ ≥ 0.8 log(500/δ),
ηt = 2λ/δ and ηw = 30λ/δ, View
(ΠGHAST,CGHAST)(Z,A, κ) has the ε latency
d ·O
(
max
{
log
(
1
εδ
)
δ3
+
ηb
δ2
})
rounds.
Proof. Given round r0, let n denote the largest event index with
(P˜ (Sn,BminN(r0)) + vn)− (P˜ (Sn−1,BminN(r0)) + vn−1) > ∆(Sn−1, en).
We define
w1(ε) := 4λ ·max
{
140
δ2
· log
(
9000
εδ2
)
,
8(ηb + 4)
δ
}
.
w2(ε) := max
{
(4 + w1(ε)/ηw) · 600
δ2
, log
(
4
ε
)
· 3000
δ3
, log
(
404
ε
)
· 200
δ
}
.
w3(ε) :=
ηtηd
m
·max
{
128
δ2
· log(8400
εδ2
),
8(ηb + 2)
δ
}
.
According to theorem 4.9, since (P˜ (Sn,BminN(r0)) + vn)− (P˜ (Sn−1,BminN(r0)) + vn−1) > ∆(Sn−1, en), there must
exists block b with Old(Bminn−1,b) = False, Old(B
min
n ,b) = True and P˜ (Sn,BminN(r0)) = P (Sn,b). According to
theorem 4.10, since Old(Bminn−1,b) = False, with probability 1− ε, P (Sn,b) ≤ w(ε).
According to the choice of n, for any n′ > n, we claim P˜ (Sn′ ,BminN(r0)) ≤ w(ε) +
∑n′
i=n+1 ∆(Si−1, ei)− (vn′ −
vn). So P˜ (Sn′ ,BminN(r0)) < −ηw if
n′∑
i=n+1
∆(Si−1, ei)− (vn′ − vn) < −ηw − w(ε). (11)
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According to theorem 4.11, with probability 1 − ε, for any event n′ which is w2(ε) rounds later than event n,
inequality 11 holds.
Let round ryoung denote the largest round that exists b such that BminN(r0) * b.past and Old(B
min
N(ryoung)
,b) = False.
According to theorem 4.12, with probability at least 1− ε,
ryoung ≤ r0 + w3(ε).
Notice that n < N(ryoung + 1) by definition, so we claim for any n′ > N(r0 + w3(ε) + w2(ε)), there will be
• P (Sn′ ,BminN(r0)) < −ηw
• For any block b ∈ Bgenn′ with BminN(r0) * b.past, it will be Old(Bminn′ ,b) = True.
According to theorem 4.7, the history of blocks in BminN(r0) will not be changed after round r0 + w2(ε) + w3(ε).
In all, the blocks released before round r0 − d will be confirmed after round r0 + w2(ε) + w3(ε) with probability
1− 3ε. Notice that w2(ε) + w3(ε) + d = d ·O
(
max
{
log(1/(εδ))
δ3 ,
ηb
δ2
})
, we have proved this theorem. 
5 Confirmation Policy
In order to show the low confirmation delay of GHAST protocol, we provide a concrete method in estimating the
block confirmation risk.
Consider a block b′ in Tree-Graph structure and suppose b′ is in the past set of a pivot block b. Then the
finalization of b′ can be reduced to block b. Given a local state B and block b ∈ Pivot(B), if block b has more
subtree weight than one of its siblings, block b may be kicked out of the pivot chain and the history of block b′ may
change. So in this section, we study the probability that block b is kicked out of pivot chain in the future under the
assumption that the blocks in Chain(b.parent) are always the common pivot chain.
For simplicity, we ignore the network delay and assume all the blocks are delivered to all the honest nodes at once.
But we still allow the attacker to withhold blocks. The confirmation policy considering the network delay can have a
similar idea, except assuming an honest participant can not see the newly generated honest block in past time 2d.
The confirmation rule consists of two parts. First, we estimate the confirmation risk under an assumption that
for the first θ blocks b′ generated later that block b.parent, if b′ is in the subtree of block b′.parent, there will be
Adapted(b′) = False. θ can be an arbitrary positive integer. Second, we estimate the probability that such assumption
is break. By the union bound, we get the confirmation risk finally.
5.1 Confirmation risk under an assumption
Here, we define two variables m and n for a Tree-Graph B. m and n shadow the same symbols defined in execution
model and security analysis.
m := An upper bound for the number of honest blocks generated later than b.parent (12)
n := A lower bound for subtree weight advantage compared between b and its siblings (13)
(When computing the subtree weight of b’s sliblings, only honest blocks are taken into account.)
The confirmation risk is computed conditioned on given m and n. In estimation for value m, notice that the blocks
in b.parent.past must be generated earlier than P (b), we can just count the number of blocks in b\b.parent.past as
the value of m. In estimation for value n, we try to distinguish the malicious blocks as many as possible. Then we
compare the subtree weight of b and its maximum siblings for the normal case. If we fail to distinguish malicious
block, we will get a more conservative confirmation risk estimation.
Let K denote the total weight of malicious block in the subtree of block b.parent, T denote the number of blocks
generated after the generation of b.parent. Although K and T are fixed in the view of execution model, but a partici-
pants can not know the exact number of how many malicious blocks generated in a given time interval. So we regard
K and T as random variables and discuss their probability distribution conditioned on m,n.
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Let random variableX0 denote the current difference between subtree weight of block b and the maximum subtree
weight of b’s sibling blocks (including the blocks withheld by the attacker). Then it will be X0 ≥ n − K. Let Xi
denote the difference after i blocks generation. So block b will be kicked out of pivot chain only if Xi < 0. Notice
that Xi+1 − Xi is independent with K and T because their randomness are from different time interval. So we can
regard K and T as fixed value in discussing Xi+1 −Xi.
We have assume that for the first θ blocks b′ generated later than b.parent, if block b′ is in the subtree of b.parent,
its block weight must be 1. 8 Let θ˜ = max{θ−T, 0}. When i ≤ θ˜, each time an honest node generate a block, Xi will
increase by 1. Each time an malicious node generates a block, Xi will decrease by at most one. We have the following
claim:
Xi −Xi−1 ≥
{
1 The i-th block is generated by honest nodes.
−1 The i-th block is generated by the attacker.
When i > θ˜, the i-th block could be a normal block or an adapted block. Since the block weight never exceed ηw,
we have−ηw ≤ Xi+1−Xi ≤ ηw. Since the normal block and adapted block have the same block weight expectation,
similarly, we have
E[Xi −Xi−1|Xi−1, · · · , X0] ≥
{
1 The i-th block is generated by honest nodes.
−1 The i-th block is generated by the attacker.
Since the adversary shares β computing power, we have E[Xi −Xi−1|Xi−1, · · · , X0] = 1− 2β. Thus
∀s > 0,E[es(Xi−1−Xi)|Xi−1, · · · , X0] ≤
{
esβ + e−s(1−β) i ≤ θ˜
1
ηw
· (esηwβ + e−sηw(1−β)) i > θ˜
We use g1(s) to denote esβ + e−s(1−β) and g2(s) to denote 1h ·
(
eshβ + e−sh(1−β)
)
. We have
∀s > 0,E[es(X0−Xi)|Xi−1, · · · , X0] ≤ g1(s)min{i,θ˜} · g2(s)max{0,i−θ˜}.
According to Markov’s inequality,
∀c > 0,∀i ≥ 0,Pr[X0 −Xi ≥ c] ≤ min
s
g1(s)
min{i,θ˜} · g2(s)max{0,i−θ˜} · e−tc.
Recalling X0 ≥ n−K, applying the union bound,
Pr[∃i ≥ 0, Xi ≤ 0] ≤ min
{
1,
+∞∑
i=1
min
s
(
g1(s)
min{i,θ˜} · g2(s)max{0,i−θ˜} · es(K−n)
)}
.
Let random variable K ′ denote the number of malicious blocks generated from the creation of b.parent to the
current time. So T ≤ m + K ′. During the time interval that honest nodes generates m + 1 blocks, the number of
malicious blocks follows the negative binomial distribution with m+ 1 successes and 1− β success probability. Thus
∀k > 0,Pr[K ′ ≥ k] ≤ I1−β(k,m+ 1). (I is regularized beta function.).
When K ′ + m ≤ θ, all the K ′ malicious blocks will be normal blocks with weight one except the blocks not in
subtree of b.parent. Thus K ≤ K ′.
Let p(K,T ) equal the right hand side of inequality (14). Notice that p(K,T ) is non-decreasing in terms of K and
T and p(n, T ) = 1. For any given t ≤ θ, the confirmation risk will be
8But we don’t discuss the probability conditioned on the assumption. If we want to learn the probability of event E, the probability under the
assumption A means Pr[E ∧A] and the probability conditioned on the assumption A means that Pr[E|A].
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EK,T [p(K,T )] ≤Pr[T > t] + EK [p(K, t)]
≤Pr[K ′ +m > t] + p(0, t) +
n∑
k=1
Pr[K ≥ k] · (p(k, t)− p(k − 1, t))
≤Pr[K ′ +m > t ∨K ′ +m > θ] + p(0, t) +
n−1∑
k=0
Pr[K ′ ≥ k] · p(k, t)
≤I1−β(t−m+ 1,m+ 1) + p(0, t) +
n−1∑
k=0
I1−β(k,m+ 1) · p(k, t)
5.2 Risk for breaking the assumption
The previous computation assumes the GHAST weight adaption is not triggered under the subtree of b.parent during
the generation of θ blocks. In this subsection, we provide a concrete method to estimate the risk that the attacker
breaks this assumption. The θth block generation time after b.parent is called the deadline.
If a block c in subtree of b.parent satisfying Adapted(c) = True. There must exists block a ∈ Chain(c) such
that
1. MaxTH(c.past)− TimerHeight(a.parent) > ηb.
2. SubTW(c.past,a)− SibSubTW(c.past,a) ≤ ηa.
Let event E1(a) and E2(a) denote that there exists block c generated before the deadline in subtree of b.parent
satisfying the first and the second condition respectively. Then the risk that the assumption is broken is no more than
Pr[∃a, E1(a) ∧ E2(a)] ≤ min{Pr[∃a, E1(a)],Pr[∃a, E2(a)]}. (14)
Now, we will discuss how to compute Pr[E1(a)] and Pr[E2(a)] for fixed block a.
Let Z denote the maximum timer height among all the generated blocks at the creation of b.parent (including the
blocks withheld by the adversary). A necessary condition forE1(c) is that there are ηb−(Z−TimerHeight(a.parent))
timer blocks among the first θ blocks after the generation of b.parent. Thus
Pr[E1(a)] ≤ Pr[B(θ, 1/ηt) ≤ ηb − (Z − TimerHeight(a.parent)] B denotes the binomial distribution (15)
The value of Z−MaxTH(b.parent) is upper bounded by the number of consecutive malicious blocks in the timer
chain, which can be estimated by chain-quality property in Nakamoto consensus proved by Pass et al [19]. We will
formally reason it in the later version.
In the estimation for Pr[E2(a)], we only consider the block a with a ∈ Chain(b.parent). Since c is in the
subtree of b.parent, it will be b.parent.past ⊆ c.past. Thus SubTW(c.past,a) ≥ SubTW(b.parent.past,a). Let
w := SubTW(b.parent.past,a) is a known value. So E2(a) happens only if
SibSubTW(c.past,a) ≥ w − ηa.
We takes two parameters as input,
m := An upper bound for the number of honest blocks generated later than a.parent and before b.parent
l := An upper bound for the total weight of honest blocks contributes to the subtree of sliblings blocks of a
So the malicious blocks must generate at least w − ηa − l block weights between the creation of a.parent and
the deadline. The probability estimation for this events compose of two steps: 1) the number N of blocks that the
adversary generates in this time interval; 2) If the adversary is allowed to generated N = n blocks and switch its
consensus strategy adaptively, how many block weights it can generated. We can choose proper n and claim that if the
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adversary generates w − ηa − l block weights during the time interval, the adversary must be either generates more
than n blocks during the time interval or generates w − ηa − l block weights in the first n blocks.
Let N1 be the number of malicious blocks generated between the creation of a.parent and b.parent and N2 be the
number of malicious blocks generated between the creation of b.parent and the deadline. So N = N1 + N2. N1 is
upper bounded by the negative binomial distribution with m+ 1 successes and β success probability, N2 is a binomial
distribution with θ trials and β success probability. By the union bound, we have
∀n1, n2,Pr[N ≥ n1 + n2] ≤ Pr
N1∼NB(m+1,1−β)
[N1 ≥ n1] + Pr
N2∼B(θ,β)
[N2 ≥ n2].
If the adversary is allowed to generate n blocks during the this interval. Let Yi denote the total block weight after
the generation of ith block. Then we have Y0 = 0 and
E[Yi − Yi−1|Yi−1, · · · , Y0] = 1.
Notice that Yi ≤ ηw, thus
∀t > 0,E[et(Yi−Yi−1)|Yi−1, · · · , Y0] ≤ ηw − 1 + e
tηw
ηw
.
So we have
Pr[Yn ≥ ρ] ≤ min
t
((
ηw − 1 + etηw
ηw
)n
· e−tρ
)
.
So an upper bound for probability of E2(a) is Pr[N ≥ n] + Pr[Yn ≥ w − ηa − l].
Taking the union bound over all the possible a gives the risk that an attacker generated an adaptive weighted
block before the deadline. In order to achieve a better result, we compute the probability of E1(a) ∧ E2(a) in batch.
Formally, we split Chain(b.parent) into several slices. For each slice S, we compute the probability that
Pr[∃c ∈ S, E1(c) ∧ E2(c)] ≤ min{Pr[∃c ∈ S, E1(c)],Pr[∃c ∈ S, E2(c)]}.
Let c′ be the oldest block in S, then Pr[∃c ∈ S, E1(c)] = Pr[E1(c′)]. In estimation of Pr[∃c ∈ S, E2(c)], we pick
the maximum m, l and minimum w among all the blocks a in the slice. (Notice that m, l, w are defined on given block
a in the estimation of Pr[E2(a)].) This gives a better result.
6 Implementation
A separated work [14] implements this protocol in the Conflux blockchain system. Under the experiment with 20Mbps
network bandwidth limit per node, Conflux chooses the block generation rate of 4 blocks per second and the block size
limit of 300K. Under this parameter, Conflux achieves a block throughput of 9.6Mbps. The experiments shows that
all the blocks can be propagated to 99% full nodes in 15 seconds, which implies λ = 60. (λ is defined in section 4.4.)
Conflux chooses the consensus protocol parameters ~η to tolerate liveness attacks from a powerful attacker that controls
40% of the network computation power. (a.k.a. β = 0.4, δ = 1 − β/(1 − β) = 1/3.) We choose the parameter
ηw = 600, 9 ηt = 2λ/δ = 360 and ηa = 3ηw.
Waiting for six blocks in Bitcoin has the confirmation risk 2 × 10−5 with β = 0.1 adversary. To obtain the
same confidence as waiting for six blocks in Bitcoin in a short time, we set ηb = 160 to make the risk output by the
computation policy small enough. In the global view, a block can be confirmed in less than three times of network
delay.
9Theorem 4.13 requires ηw = 30λ/δ. This requirement derives from lemma B.9. With the concrete parameter λ = 60 and δ = 1/3, we find a
smaller solution ηw = 600 which achieves the same results as lemma B.9 in complexity.
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7 Conclusion
In this work, we design a novel consensus protocol that achieves security and low confirmation delay in a normal
scenario. The protocol executes two consensus strategies to achieve efficiency in normal cases and switch to a conser-
vative strategy in defending a liveness attack. We provide a rigorous security analysis to show such design can resolve
all the possible liveness issues in GHOST protocol. Any block will become ε−finalized after a logarithm time after
its release. A separated work [14] implements this protocol and shows that the block can be confirmed in less than 3d
in the global view.
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A.1 Preparation
First we remind the most frequently used notations in this section. Functions Chain(·),SubT(·), SubTW(·) are
SibSubTW(·) are defined in section 3. Functions TotalW(·), Tip(·) and Next are defined in the beginning of sec-
tion 4.3. There are four types of events hGenRls, mGen, mRls and Arvl defined in section 4.3.1. Recalling that we use
symbolsBgen,Bmax,Bmin,M, f ,C, S, v to denote corresponding components of adversary state S in the context and
use the symbols with subscript “−1” to denote components of S−1. These symbols will never be used as ephemeral
symbols. b1  b2 represents the relation b1 ∈ Chain(b2). If furthermore there is b1 6= b2, we write b1 ≺ b2. Since
the local state B of a participant node is essentially a graph B, we use B to denote the local state here.
We claim the necessary condition and sufficient condition for a block b ∈ B be in the pivot chain Pivot(B).
Lemma A.1 For any graph B and a block b in graph B, let g be the genesis block, the sufficient condition and
necessary condition of b ∈ Pivot(B).
• Sufficient condition: ∀b′ ∈ Chain(b)\{g}, SubTW(B,b′)− SibSubTW(B,b′) > 0
• Necessary condition: ∀b′ ∈ Chain(b), SubTW(B,b′)− SibSubTW(B,b′) ≥ 0
Proof. Recalling that the pivot chain is a list of blocks which starts with the genesis block g and recursively expands
the best child (defined in equation 5) of last block into it. So the necessary and sufficient condition for b ∈ Pivot(B)
is ∀b′ ∈ Chain(b)\{g},b′ = BestChild(B,b′.parent). (g is the genesis block.) The definition of best child in
eq. (5) shows that the sufficient condition and necessary condition for b′ = BestChild(B,b′.parent)
• Sufficient condition: SubTW(B,b′)− SibSubTW(B,b′) > 0
• Necessary condition: SubTW(B,b′)− SibSubTW(B,b′) ≥ 0
So we have the necessary condition and sufficient condition for pivot chain.
• Sufficient condition: ∀b′ ∈ Chain(b)\{g}, SubTW(B,b′)− SibSubTW(B,b′) > 0
• Necessary condition: ∀b′ ∈ Chain(b)\{g}, SubTW(B,b′)− SibSubTW(B,b′) ≥ 0
Specially, the genesis block doesn’t have any sibling blocks, so SibSubTW(B,g) = 0 always holds. Thus
SubTW(B,g)− SibSubTW(B,g) ≥ 0 can be also a necessary condition. 
We claim some properties which derives from the definitions directly. We do not explicitly refer the previous two
claims in use since they are intuitive.
By the definition of SubT(B,b),SubTW(B,b) and SibSubTW(B,b) in eq. (2,3,6), when the graphB includes
more blocks, the outputs of these three functions will be non-decreasing. Formally, we have the following claim.
Claim A.2 For any set of blocks B and a block b, we have SubT(B,b) ⊆ B.
For any set of blocks B1 and B2 with B1 ⊆ B2 and a block b, we have SubT(B2,b) = SubT(B1,b) ∪
SubT(B2\B1,b) , SubTW(B2,b) = SubTW(B1,b)+SubTW(B2\B1,b) and SibSubTW(B1,b) ≤ SibSubTW(B2,b).
For any set of blocksB and blocksb1,b2 withb1  b2, we have SubT(B,b2) ⊆ SubT(B,b1) and SubTW(B,b2) ≤
SubTW(B,b1).
Recalling that protocol ΠGHAST is the same as ΠTG except the block weight. In ΠTG, the validity of a block
requires Pivot(b.past) ◦ b = Chain(b). So the ghast protocol inherits such property.
Claim A.3 For any block b, we have Pivot(b.past) ◦ b = Chain(b).
Claim A.4 Let P be a list of blocks in which any two consecutive blocks are in parent/child relation. (The outputs of
Chain(b′) for some block b′ and the chain C in the adversary state satisfy such requirement.)
For any b ∈ P\{Tip(P)}, let b1 := Next(P,b), it will be b1 6= ⊥ and b1.parent = b.
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A.2 Properties for concepts
Before touching the potential value, we prove some important properties for concepts first.
Proof of Lemma 4.4. For any block b ∈ Bmax and its children blocks b1,b2 ∈ Chldn(Bmax,b) (b1 6= b2). Since
SibSubTW(B,b) (defined in eq. (6))returns the maximum subtree weight of sibling blocks in b, and block b1 and b2
are on sibling relationship, we can claim SibSubTW(Bmax,b1) ≥ SubTW(Bmax,b2) and SibSubTW(Bmax,b2) ≥
SubTW(Bmax,b1). Because block f is in B∆, we have Bmin ∪ {f} ⊆ Bmax. Thus
Adv((Bmax,Bmin, f),b1) + Adv((B
max,Bmin, f),b2)
≤SubTW(Bmax,b1)− SubTW(Bmax,b2) + SubTW(Bmax,b2)− SubTW(Bmax,b1)
≤0
Thus it can not be Adv((Bmax,Bmin, f),b1) > 0 and Adv((Bmax,Bmin, f),b2) > 0. 
Lemma A.5 For any adversary state S appearing in the execution of ghast protocol, let S−1 be the last adversary state
and e be the event updates S−1 to S. If flag block f−1 = ⊥, then C−1 must be a prefix of pivot chain Pivot(e.block).
Proof. Letb := e.block,B := b.past. Since f−1 = ⊥, for any blockb′ ∈ Bmax−1 , Adv(S−1,b′) = SubTW
(
Bmin−1 ,b
′)−
SibSubTW
(
Bmax−1 ,b
′). By claim 4.5.1, for any block b′ ∈ C−1, Adv(S−1,b′) > 0. Since B−1 is the local state of
the honest node who generates b, according to claim 4.1, Bmin−1 ⊆ B−1 ⊆ Bmax−1 . So we have
∀b′ ∈ C−1,SubTW(B−1,b′)− SibSubTW(B−1,b′) ≥ SubTW
(
Bmin−1 ,b
′)− SibSubTW(Bmax−1 ,b′) > 0.
According to lemma A.1, block Tip(C−1) must be in Pivot(B−1) and thusC−1 is a prefix of pivot chain Pivot(B−1)
when f−1 = ⊥. Since Pivot(B−1) ◦ b = Chain(b), C−1 is also a prefix of Chain(b). 
Lemma A.6 For any adversary state S appearing in the execution of ghast protocol, any graph B satisfying Bmin ⊆
B ⊆ Bmax and any block b which is not genesis block. We have
SubTW(B,b)− SibSubTW(B,b) ≤ Adv(S,b) + SubTW(B∆,b.parent).
Proof. By the definition of SubTW(·), for any block b, we have
SubTW(Bmax,b)− SubTW(Bmin,b) = SubTW(B∆,b).
As for the upper bound of SibSubTW(Bmax,b) − SibSubTW(Bmin,b) for any block b except the genesis
block g. If Chldn(Bmax,b.parent)\{b} is empty set, then Chldn(Bmin,b.parent)\{b} will also be empty set and
SibSubTW(Bmax,b) − SibSubTW(Bmin,b) = 0. Otherwise let b′ be the block with maximum subtree weight in
Chldn(Bmax,b′.parent)\{b′}. Then SibSubTW(Bmax,b′) = SubTW(Bmax,b′). Ifb′ /∈ Chldn(Bmin,b.parent)\{b},
it must be b′ ∈ B∆. So all the blocks in subtree of b′ not appears in Bmin, and thus SubT(Bmin,b′) = 0. If
b′ ∈ Chldn(Bmin,b.parent)\{b}, then SibSubTW(Bmin,b′) ≥ SubTW(Bmin,b′). In summary for the case b′
exists, we have
SibSubTW(Bmax,b′)− SibSubTW(Bmin,b′) ≤ SubTW(Bmax,b′)− SubTW(Bmin,b′) = SubTW(B∆,b′).
Recalling that b′.parent = b.parent, we have the following result for both cases that b′ exists or not.
SibSubTW(Bmax,b)− SibSubTW(Bmin,b) ≤ SubTW(B∆,b.parent)− SubTW(B∆,b).
Notice that Adv(S,b) ≥ SubTW(Bmin,b)− SibSubTW(Bmax,b) by definition. We have
Adv(S,b) + SubTW(B∆,b.parent) ≥SubTW(Bmax,b)− SibSubTW(Bmin,b)
≥SubTW(B,b)− SibSubTW(B,b)

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Lemma A.7 For any adversary state S appearing in the execution of ghast protocol, let S−1 be the last adversary
state and e be the event updates S−1 to S. If e is the hGenRls event of a flag block (a.k.a. f−1 = ⊥ and f = e.block),
then we have ∀b′ ∈ Chain(e.block),Adv(S,b′) > ηw − sh − sm.
Proof. We denote block e.block by b and denote graph b.past byB−1. Since b is an honest block,B−1 must be the lo-
cal state of an honest node when adversary state is S, thusBmin−1 ⊆ B−1 ⊆ Bmax−1 by claim 4.1. Since Chain(b)\{b} =
Pivot(B−1), according to the necessary condition of pivot chain, for any blockb′ in Chain(b)\{b}, SubTW(B−1,b′)−
SibSubTW(B−1,b′) ≥ 0. Since b.parent is the last block of the pivot chain Pivot(B−1), B−1 must have no child
block in B−1. Thus SibSubTW(B−1,b) = 0. So we have
∀b′ ∈ Chain(b),SubTW(B−1,b′)− SibSubTW(B−1,b′) ≥ 0.
Since f−1 = ⊥ and Bmax−1 ⊆ B−1 ⊆ Bmin−1 , according to lemma A.6, we have
∀b′ ∈ Chain(b)\{g}, Adv(S−1,b′) + SubTW
(
B∆−1,b
′.parent
)
≥SubTW(B−1,b′)− SibSubTW(B−1,b′)
≥0.
According to our rule in maintaining the flag block, when f−1 = ⊥ and f = e.block, B∆−1 has no honest block
with block weight ηw and Spe(S−1) = False. Let T−1 := SubT
(
B∆−1,Tip(C−1)
)
, according to the definition of
special status (definition 4.2), we have TotalW(T−1 ∩M−1) < sm and |
{
b ∈ B∆−1\M−1 | b.weight = 1
} | < sh.
Since there is no honest block with block weight ηw in B∆−1, |
{
b ∈ B∆−1\M−1 | b.weight = ηw
} | = 0. Thus
TotalW(T−1) < sm + sh. Since f−1 = ⊥, according to lemma A.5, C−1 is a prefix of Chain(b). For any block b′
in Chain(b)\C−1, we have SubT
(
B∆−1,b
′.parent
) ⊆ T−1. Thus,
∀b′ ∈ Chain(b)\C−1,SubTW
(
B∆−1,b
′.parent
) ≤ TotalW(T) < sm + sh.
Since genesis block g must be in C−1, for all the blocks b′ in Chain(b)\C−1, the previous two inequalities give
Adv(S−1,b′) > −sh − sm. According to claim 4.5.1, for the blocks b′ in C−1, we have Adv(S−1,b′) > 0. Thus
∀b′ ∈ Chain(b),Adv(S−1,b′) > −sh − sm.
According to the rule in updating adversary state, hGenRls event does not modify Bmin, so Bmin−1 = B
min. By
claim 4.3, f /∈ Bmin. For all the blocks b′ in Chain(b), SubT({b},b′) = {b}. Note that b and f refers the same
block, and the block weight of flag block is ηw. So we have
SubTW
(
Bmin ∪ {f},b′) = SubTW(Bmin−1 ,b′)+ ηw.
For any block b′ ∈ Chain(b) and b′1 ∈ Chldn(Bmax,b′.parent)\{b′}, it must be SubTW
(
Bmax−1 ,b
′
1
)
=
SubTW(Bmax,b′1) because B
max is one block b different from Bmax−1 and it is not in subtree of b
′
1. Thus
∀b′ ∈ Chain(b),SibSubTW(Bmax,b′) = SibSubTW(Bmax−1 ,b′).
Summarize all the previous results, we have
∀b′ ∈ Chain(b), SubTW(Bmin ∪ {f},b′)− SibSubTW(Bmax,b′)
=SubTW
(
Bmin−1 ,b
′)− SibSubTW(Bmax−1 ,b′)+ ηw
>ηw − sm − sh

Now we will show that when the adversary state is updated from S−1 to S , one of C−1 and C must be the prefix
of another.
Lemma A.8 For any adversary state S appearing in the execution of ghast protocol, let S−1 be the last adversary
state and e be the event updates S−1 to S. One of C−1 and C must be the prefix of another.
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Proof. We prove this property by contradiction. We assumeC−1 is not the prefix ofC andC is not the prefix ofC−1.
Let bc be the last block of common prefix between C and C−1. Let b1 := Next(C−1,bc), b2 := Next(C,bc).
There should be b1 6= b2, b1 6= ⊥ and b2 6= ⊥. According to claim 4.5.1, Adv(S−1,b1) > 0, Adv(S,b2) > 0.
Since b1 and b2 have the same parent block, according to lemma 4.4, Adv(S−1,b2) ≤ 0, Adv(S,b1) ≤ 0. Thus
Adv(S,b1)−Adv(S−1,b1) < 0 and Adv(S,b2)−Adv(S−1,b2) > 0.
Recalling that Adv(S,b) is defined by SubTW(Bmin ∪ {f},b)−SibSubTW(Bmax,b).We discuss in two cases
with f−1 = f and f−1 6= f .
Case 1: f−1 = f , claim 4.3 guarantees f /∈ Bmin and f−1 /∈ Bmin−1 when f 6= ⊥. So for any block b
Adv(S,b)−Adv(S−1,b)
=
(
SubTW
(
Bmin,b
)− SubTW(Bmin−1 ,b))− (SibSubTW(Bmax,b)− SibSubTW(Bmax−1 ,b)) .
Case 1.1: e is hGenRls or mRls event.
It will be Bmin−1 = B
min and Bmax−1 ⊆ Bmax. So for any block b, Adv(S,b) − Adv(S−1,b) ≤ 0. It can not be
Adv(S,b2)−Adv(S−1,b2) > 0.
Case 1.2: e is Arvl event.
It will be Bmin−1 ⊆ Bmin and Bmax−1 = Bmax. So for any block b, Adv(S,b) − Adv(S−1,b) ≥ 0. It can not be
Adv(S,b1)−Adv(S−1,b1) < 0.
Case 1.3: e is a mGen event.
It will be Bmin−1 = B
min and Bmax−1 = B
max. So for any block b, Adv(S,b) − Adv(S−1,b) = 0. It can not be
Adv(S,b2)−Adv(S−1,b2) > 0.
Case 2: f−1 6= f . There could be three possible sub-cases according to the rule updating f .
Case 2.1: e.type = hGenRls, f−1 6= ⊥ and f = ⊥.
It will be Bmin−1 ∪ {f−1} ⊆ Bmin ∪ {f} and Bmax−1 ⊆ Bmax. So for any block b, Adv(S,b)−Adv(S−1,b) ≤ 0. It
can not be Adv(S,b2)−Adv(S−1,b2) > 0.
Case 2.2: e.type = Arvl, f−1 = e.block and f = ⊥.
f−1 is included intoBmin. SoBmin−1 ∪{f−1} = Bmin∪{f}. An Arvl event does not updateBmax, soBmax−1 = Bmax.
Thus for any block b, Adv(S,b)−Adv(S−1,b) = 0. It can not be Adv(S,b2)−Adv(S−1,b2) > 0.
Case 2.3: e.type = hGenRls, f−1 = ⊥ and f = e.block.
Let Bf = f .past. According to lemma A.7, ∀b′ ∈ Chain(f), Adv(S,b′) > ηw − sm − sh ≥ sm + sh. (Recalling
that we require ηw ≥ 2sm + 2sh.) According to claim 4.5.3, Chain(f) is a prefix of C. Since f 6= ⊥ and e is the
hGenRls event of f , according to lemma A.5, C−1 is a prefix of Chain(f). Thus C−1 is a prefix of C.
As a summary, the cases except case 2.3 are proved by contradiction. For the case 2.3, we show C−1 is a prefix of
C directly. 
Lemma A.9 For any adversary state S appearing in the execution of ghast protocol, let S−1 be the last adversary
state and e be the event updates S−1 to S.
Tip(C−1) ≺ Tip(C) only if one of the following condition holds:
• e.type = Arvl and f−1 = f .
• e.type = hGenRls, f−1 = ⊥ and f = e.block.
Tip(C) ≺ Tip(C−1) only if one of the following condition holds:
• e.type ∈ {hGenRls,mRls} and f−1 = f .
• e.type = hGenRls, f−1 6= ⊥ and f = ⊥.
Proof. If Tip(C−1) ≺ Tip(C), let b := Next(C,Tip(C−1)). According to claim 4.5.2, since b is the child
block of Tip(C−1), Adv(S−1,b) ≤ sh + sm. According to claim 4.5.2, since Tip(C−1) ≺ b and b ∈ C, so
Adv(S,b) > sh + sm. So Adv(S,b)−Adv(S−1,b) > 0.
In the proof of lemma A.8, there is no block satisfying Adv(S,b) − Adv(S−1,b) > 0 in case 1.1, 1.3, 2.1, 2.2.
Thus Tip(C−1) ≺ Tip(C) only if one of the following condition holds.
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• e.type = Arvl and f−1 = f .
• e.type = hGenRls, f−1 = ⊥ and f = e.block.
If Tip(C) ≺ Tip(C−1), let b := Next(C−1,Tip(C)). Since b is the child block of Tip(C−1) and b 
Tip(C), according to claim 4.5.1, Adv(S,b) ≤ 0. Since b ∈ C−1, according to claim 4.5.2, Adv(S−1,b) > 0. So
Adv(S,b)−Adv(S−1,b) < 0.
In the proof of lemma A.8, there is no block satisfying Adv(S,b)−Adv(S−1,b) < 0 in case 1.2, 1.3, 2.2. It also
shows C−1 is a prefix of C in case 2.3. Thus Tip(C) ≺ Tip(C−1) only if one of the following condition holds.
• e.type ∈ {hGenRls,mRls} and f−1 = f .
• e.type = hGenRls, f−1 6= ⊥ and f = ⊥.

Lemma A.10 For any adversary state S appearing in the execution of ghast protocol, let S−1 be the last adversary
state and e be the event updates S−1 to S. Let bc := Tip(Pivot(B−1) ∩C−1).
If e.type = hGenRls, Spe(S−1) = False and Old(Bmin−1 ,b) = True, then Adapt(e.block) = con.
Proof. Let b := e.block and B−1 := b.past. Since B−1 is the local state of the honest node who generates b,
according to claim 4.1, Bmin−1 ⊆ B−1 ⊆ Bmax−1 . Since Old(Bmin−1 ,b) = True and Bmin−1 ⊆ B−1, it can be verified that
Old(B−1,bc) = True.
Let bc1 = Next(Pivot(B−1),bc). If bc1 = ⊥, bc will be the last block in the pivot chain of B−1. Since we have
Old(B−1,bc) = True, Adapt(b) = con according to the second rule in definition 3.1.
In the following, we discuss the case bc1 6= ⊥ according to whether C−1 is a prefix of Pivot(B−1) or not. Since
bc1 6= ⊥, it is the child block of bc.
Case 1: C−1 is a prefix of (or equals to) Pivot(B−1).
In this case, bc = Tip(C−1). Since bc1 is the child of bc, according to claim 4.5.2,
Adv(S−1,bc1) ≤ sh + sm.
LetT−1 := SubT
(
B∆−1,Tip(C−1)
)
, according to the definition of special status (definition 4.2), we have TotalW(T−1∩
M−1) < sm, |
{
b′ ∈ B∆−1\M−1 | b′.weight = 1
} | < sh and |{b′ ∈ B∆−1\M−1 | b′.weight = ηw} | ≤ 2. Thus
SubT
(
B∆−1,bc1.parent
)
= TotalW(T) < sm + sh + 2ηw.
Recalling that we require ηa ≥ 2sm + 2sh + 2ηw. According to lemma A.6,
SubTW(B−1,bc1)− SibSubTW(B−1,bc1)
≤Adv(S−1,bc1) + SubT
(
B∆−1,bc1.parent
)
<2sm + 2sh + 2ηw
≤ηa.
Since we are given Old(B,bc) = True, we have Adapt(b) = con according to the first rule in definition 3.1.
Case 2: C−1 is not a prefix of (or equals to) Pivot(B−1).
In this case, we claim that bc is not the last block in C−1. Let bc2 := Next(C−1,bc). According to claim 4.5.1,
Adv(S−1,bc2) > 0. Since bc1 and bc2 are in sibling relations and SibSubTW(·) returns the maximum sub-
tree weight among sibling blocks (defined in eq. (6)), we have SubTW(B−1,bc1) ≤ SibSubTW(B−1,bc2) and
SubTW(B−1,bc2) ≤ SibSubTW(B−1,bc1). (For the special case bc2 /∈ B−1, these two inequalities also hold.) So
we have
SubTW(B−1,bc1)− SibSubTW(B−1,bc1)
≤SibSubTW(B−1,bc2)− SubTW(B−1,bc2)
≤SibSubTW(Bmax−1 ,bc2)− SubTW(Bmin−1 ∪ {f−1},bc2)+ ηw
<ηw
≤ηa.
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Since we are given Old(B,bc) = True, we have Adapt(b) = con according to the first rule in definition 3.1. 
A.3 Case discussions for potential value (Part 1)
Common settings For any adversary state S appearing in the execution of ghast protocol, let S−1 be the last adver-
sary state and e be the event updates S−1 to S . In this sub-section, we study the upper bound of block potential value
difference P (S,b)−P (S−1,b) under the assumption that P (S−1,b) 6= ⊥ and P (S,b) 6= ⊥. All the lemmas in this
section assumes P (S−1,b) 6= ⊥ and P (S,b) 6= ⊥. We will also not repeat them in the following lemmas (except
lemma A.23) since they are not referred outside this section. The upper bound of
We define symbol c−1 := Next(C−1,b) and c := Next(C,b) for given C−1, C and b in the context. So c and
c−1 are the child of block b when they are not ⊥. According to lemma A.8, one of C−1 and C must be the prefix
of another. So if c−1 6= ⊥ and c 6= ⊥, there must be c−1 = c. These property are frequently used and we do not
explicitly refer them in the following. We define symbol N := {b′ ∈ Bmax\M | b′.weight = 1} for given Bmax and
M in the context and we define N−1 similarly.
Now we start the case discussion for three components Pwith, Padv, Psp.
A.3.1 The first component
Lemma A.11 If e is mGen event, then Pwith(S,b)− Pwith(S−1,b) ≤ e.block.weight.
If e is mRls event and b  e.block, then Pwith(S,b)− Pwith(S−1,b) ≤ −e.block.weight.
For other cases, Pwith(S,b)− Pwith(S−1,b) = 0.
Proof. Let be = e.block. Recalling that Pwith(S,b) = SubTW(Bgen\Bmax,b).
If e is mGen event, we have Bgen\Bgen−1 = {be} and Bmax = Bmax−1 . So Pwith(S,b)− Pwith(S−1,b) ≤ be.weight.
If e is mRls event, we have Bgen = Bgen−1 , B
max\Bmax−1 = {be} and be ∈ Bgen. So Bgen−1\Bmax−1 has one more
element be than Bgen\Bmax. When be  b, be ∈ SubT
(
Bgen−1\Bmax−1 ,b
)
and thus Pwith(S,b) − Pwith(S−1,b) ≤
−be.weight. Otherwise Pwith(S,b)− Pwith(S−1,b) = 0.
If e is hGenRls event, we have Bgen\Bgen−1 = {be} and Bmax\Bmax−1 = {be}. Thus Bgen−1\Bmax−1 = Bgen\Bmax and
Pwith(S,b)− Pwith(S−1,b) = 0.
If e is Arvl event, we have Bgen = Bgen−1 and B
max = Bmax−1 . Thus Pwith(S,b)− Pwith(S−1,b) = 0. 
A.3.2 The second component
In discussing the component Padv, for the case f = f−1, we discuss the upper bound of Padv(S, c)−Padv(S, c−1) and
Padv(S, c−1)− Padv(S−1, c−1) respectively and combine them later.
Lemma A.12 If e is hGenRls event, f−1 = f , Spe(S−1) = False and e.block.weight = 1, then it will be
Padv(S, c−1)− Padv(S−1, c−1) ≤ −1.
Proof. Let be = e.block. If c−1 = ⊥, we have b = Tip(C−1). According to lemma A.5,C−1 is a prefix of be. Thus
b = Tip(C−1 ∩ Chain(be)). Since P (S−1,b) 6= ⊥, we have Old(Bmin−1 ,b) = True. According to lemma A.10,
Adapt(be) = con. So be.weight 6= 1 according to equation 9. This contradicts the assumption be.weight = 1 in this
lemma. Thus, c−1 cannot be ⊥.
Since e.type = hGenRls and be.weight = 1, N must has one more element be compared to N−1. Since c−1 ∈
C−1 and C−1 is a prefix of be, it will be c−1  be. Thus SubT
(
B∆, c−1
)
has one more element be compared to
SubT
(
B∆−1, c−1
)
. Since Spe(S−1) = False, according to the definition of special status, B∆−1 has at most sh − 1
honest blocks with block weight 1. Thus |SubT(B∆−1, c−1)| ≤ sh − 1. So we have
TotalW(SubT
(
B∆, c−1
) ∩N) = TotalW(SubT(B∆−1, c−1) ∩N−1) + 1 ≤ sh.
Since c−1  be and Bmax has one more element be than Bmax−1 , all the sibling blocks of c−1 has the same subtree
in Bmax and Bmax−1 . So we have SibSubTW(B
max,be) = SibSubTW
(
Bmax−1 ,be
)
. We also have Bmin ∪ {f} =
Bmin−1 ∪ {f−1} because e.type 6= Arvl and f = f−1. Thus
Adv(S, c−1)−Adv(S−1, c−1) = 0.
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Recalling that Padv(S, c) = sh + sm −Adv(S, c)−min{sh,TotalW(SubT
(
B∆, c
) ∩N)}. Thus we have
Adv(S, c−1)−Adv(S, c−1) = −1.

Lemma A.13 If e is a mRls event, f = f−1, c−1 6= ⊥ and e.block ∈ SubT(Bmax,b)\SubT(Bmax, c−1). We have
Padv(S, c−1)− Padv(S−1, c−1) ≤ e.block.weight.
For all the other cases satisfying f = f−1,
Padv(S, c−1)− Padv(S−1, c−1) ≤ 0.
Proof. Let be := e.block. In this proof, we try to find all the cases with Padv(S, c−1) − Padv(S−1, c−1) > 0. When
c−1 = ⊥, both Padv(S, c−1) and Padv(S−1, c−1) equal to 0. So we only focus on the case with c−1 6= ⊥.
We study the difference between SubT
(
B∆−1, c−1
)∩N−1 and SubT(B∆, c−1)∩N. Since e does not a hGenRls
event, we have N = N−1. Thus
min{TotalW(SubT(B∆−1, c−1) ∩N−1), sh} −min{TotalW(SubT(B∆, c−1) ∩N), sh}
≤max{0,TotalW(SubT(B∆−1, c−1) ∩N)− TotalW(SubT(B∆, c−1) ∩N)}
≤SubTW((B∆−1\B∆) ∩N, c−1)
By the definition of Padv, we have
Padv(S, c−1)− Padv(S−1, c−1) ≤ Adv(S−1, c−1)−Adv(S, c−1) + SubTW
(
(B∆−1\B∆) ∩N, c−1
)
.
Notice that B∆−1\B∆ = (Bmax−1 \Bmin−1 )\(Bmax\Bmin). If Bmin = Bmin−1 , then B∆−1\B∆ ⊆ (Bmax−1 \Bmax) = ∅. So
B∆−1\B∆ 6= ∅ only ifBmin 6= Bmin−1 and thus emust be anArvl event. We can claim SubTW
(
(B∆−1\B∆) ∩N, c−1
)
>
0 only if e is an Arvl event and c−1  be. In this case, Bmax−1 = Bmax and B∆ ⊆ B∆−1, so we have
If SubTW
(
(B∆−1\B∆) ∩H, c−1
)
> 0,
Adv(S−1, c−1)−Adv(S, c−1) + SubTW
(
(B∆−1\B∆) ∩H, c−1
)
≤SubTW(Bmin−1 , c−1)− SubTW(Bmin, c−1)+ SubTW(B∆−1, c−1)− SubTW(B∆, c−1)
=SubTW
(
Bmax−1 , c−1
)− SubTW(Bmax, c−1)
=0
Thus we have
Padv(S, c−1)− Padv(S−1, c−1) ≤ max{0,Adv(S−1, c−1)−Adv(S, c−1)}.
Now we only need to study in which cases Adv(S−1, c−1) > Adv(S, c−1). It can only happens when SibSubTW(Bmax, c−1) >
SibSubTW
(
Bmax−1 , c−1
)
. Thus it must be
e.type ∈ {hGenRls,mRls} and be ∈ SubT(Bmax,b)\SubT(Bmax, c−1).
If e.type = mRls, sinceBmax andBmax−1 differ at one blockbe, SibSubTW(B
max, c−1)−SibSubTW
(
Bmax−1 , c−1
) ≤
be.weight and thus
Adv(S−1, c−1)−Adv(S, c−1) ≤ be.weight.
If e.type = hGenRls, recalling that block b is the parent of c−1 and c−1 ∈ C−1, we have Tip(Chain(be) ∩
C−1) = b. Since P (S−1,b) 6= ⊥, we have Old(Bmin−1 ,b) = True. According to lemma A.10, Adapt(be) = con. So
be.weight equals to 0 or ηw. We have three sub-cases as follows.
1. If be.weight = 0, thenBmax andBmax−1 differ at one block with zero block weight. So SibSubTW(B
max, c−1) =
SibSubTW
(
Bmax−1 , c−1
)
.
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2. If be.weight = ηw and f 6= ⊥, since be is an honest block and e.type = hGenRls, according to the rule in
updating flag block, we have f = ⊥ 6= f . This contradicts to our assumption.
3. If f = ⊥, since be is an honest block and e.type = hGenRls, according to lemma A.5, C−1 should be a prefix
of Chain(be) and thus c−1 ∈ Chain(be). This contradicts be /∈ SubT(Bmax, c−1).
In all, if e.type = hGenRls, all the three sub-cases cannot be Adv(S−1, c−1) > Adv(S, c−1).
As a summary for the whole proof, for the case f = f−1, Padv(S, c−1) − Padv(S−1, c−1) > 0 only if e.type =
mRls, c−1 6= ⊥ and e.block ∈ SubT(Bmax,b)\SubT(Bmax, c−1). For this case, we have
Padv(S, c−1)− Padv(S−1, c−1) ≤ e.block.weight.

Lemma A.14 If c−1 6= ⊥ and c = ⊥, then
Padv(S, c)− Padv(S, c−1) ≤ −sm.
For the other cases,
Padv(S, c)− Padv(S, c−1) ≤ 0.
Proof. If c = c−1, then Padv(S, c)− Padv(S, c−1) = 0 holds trivially.
If c 6= c−1, then one of c and c−1 equals to ⊥. (Recalling that c = c−1 if c−1 6= ⊥ and c 6= ⊥.)
Case 1: c = ⊥ and c−1 6= ⊥.
Since c = ⊥, b should be Tip(C). Since block c−1 is the child block of b and c−1  Tip(C−1), according to
claim 4.5.2, Adv(S, c−1) ≤ 0. Since min{TotalW(SubT(Bmax, c−1) ∩N), sh} ≤ sh and sh ≥ 0, we have
Padv(S, c)− Padv(S, c−1) = −Padv(S, c−1) ≤ Adv(S, c−1) + sh − sh − sm ≤ −sm.
Case 2: c 6= ⊥ and c−1 = ⊥.
Since c−1 = ⊥, b should be Tip(C−1). Since block c is the child block of b, we have Tip(C−1) ≺ c, according
to claim 4.5.1, Adv(S, c) > sh + sm. Since min{TotalW(SubT(Bmax, c) ∩N), sh} ≥ 0, we have
Padv(S, c)− Padv(S, c−1) = Padv(S, c) ≤ sh + sm −Adv(S, c) < 0.

Lemma A.15 If e.type = hGenRls, e.block.weight = ηw, f−1 = ⊥ and f = e.block, then
Padv(S, c)− Padv(S−1, c−1) ≤ 2sh + 2sm − ηw.
Proof. Let be := e.block. If e.type = hGenRls, f−1 = ⊥ and f = e.block, according to lemma A.7, for all the block
b′ in Chain(be), we have Adv(S,b′) > ηw − sh− sm ≥ sh + sm. According to claim 4.5.3, Chain(be) is a prefix of
C. Since be /∈ Bmin, be cannot be an old enough block and thus P (S,be) = ⊥. So b cannot be the last block in C.
We claim
c 6= ⊥.
Case 1: c−1 6= ⊥. It will be c = c−1
Recalling that c ∈ Chain(be), so the subtree weight for the sibling blocks of c does not change. We have
SibSubTW(Bmax, c) = SibSubTW
(
Bmax−1 , c
)
. Since e.type = hGenRls, f−1 = ⊥ and f = e.block, Bmin ∪ {f}
has one more block be than Bmin−1 ∪ {f−1}. So SubTW
(
Bmin−1 ∪ {f−1}, c
)− SubTW(Bmin ∪ {f}, c) = −be.weight.
Since be = f , the block weight of be must be ηw. Thus
Adv(S−1, c)−Adv(S, c−1) = −ηw.
Since be.weight = ηw and N only contains honest blocks with block weight 1, we have SubT
(
B∆−1, c
) ∩N−1 =
SubT
(
B∆, c
) ∩N. So in this case,
Padv(S, c)− Padv(S−1, c−1) ≤ Adv(S−1, c)−Adv(S, c) + sh = sh − ηw.
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Case 2: c−1 = ⊥.
Recalling that c ∈ Chain(be) and so Adv(S, c) > ηw − sh − sm according to lemma A.7. Thus
Padv(S, c)− Padv(S−1, c−1) ≤ sh + sm −Adv(S, c) < 2sh + 2sm − ηw.

Lemma A.16 If e.type = hGenRls, e.block.weight = ηw, f−1 6= ⊥ and f = ⊥, we have
Padv(S, c)− Padv(S−1, c−1) ≤ ηw.
Proof. Let be := e.block and B−1 := be.past. Since be is an honest block, according to claim 4.1, Bmin−1 ⊆ B−1 ⊆
Bmax−1 . Since e.block.weight = ηw, f−1 6= ⊥ and f = ⊥, according to lemma A.9, it cannot be Tip(C−1) ≺ Tip(C).
Thus it cannot be c−1 = ⊥ ∧ c 6= ⊥.
Case 1: c−1 6= ⊥ and c 6= ⊥. It will be c = c−1.
Since be.weight = ηw and N only contains honest blocks with block weight 1, we have SubT
(
B∆−1, c
) ∩N−1 =
SubT
(
B∆, c
) ∩N. So in this case,
Padv(S, c)− Padv(S−1, c−1) ≤ Adv(S−1, c−1)−Adv(S, c).
Since c ∈ C, according to claim 4.5.1, ∀b′ ∈ Chain(c),Adv(S, c) > 0. Since f = ⊥, we have Bmin ∪ {f} = Bmin.
Since e.type = hGenRls, we have Bmin = Bmin−1 . Recalling that B
min
−1 ⊆ B−1 ⊆ Bmax−1 , we have
∀b′ ∈ Chain(c), SubTW(B−1,b′)− SibSubTW(B−1,b′)
≥SubTW(Bmin−1 ,b′)− SibSubTW(Bmax−1 ,b′)
≥SubTW(Bmin,b′)− SibSubTW(Bmax,b′)
>0
According to lemma A.1, c ∈ Pivot(B−1). Thus c ≺ be. Since Bmax and Bmax−1 only differs at block be, we have
SibSubTW
(
Bmax−1 , c
)
= SibSubTW(Bmax, c). Recalling that Bmin−1 = B
min and f = ⊥, we have
Adv(S−1, c−1)−Adv(S, c) = SubTW
(
Bmin−1 ∪ {f−1}, c
)− SubTW(Bmin ∪ {f}, c) ≤ ηw.
Combined with the first inequality in this proof, we have proved Padv(S, c)− Padv(S−1, c−1) ≤ ηw for this case.
Case 2: c−1 6= ⊥ and c = ⊥.
We prove this case by showing that Adv(S−1, c−1) ≤ ηw. If Adv(S−1, c−1) > ηw, recalling that Bmin−1 ⊆ B−1 ⊆
Bmax−1 , we have
SubTW(B−1, c−1)− SibSubTW(B−1, c−1)
≥SubTW(Bmin−1 , c−1)− SibSubTW(Bmax−1 , c−1)
≥SubTW(Bmin−1 ∪ {f}, c−1)− ηw − SibSubTW(Bmax−1 , c−1)
>0.
So c−1 is the child with maximum subtree weight of b. If b ∈ Pivot(B−1), there must be c−1 ∈ Pivot(B−1).
Thus no matter b belongs to Pivot(B−1) or not, the sibling blocks of c−1 are not in Pivot(B−1) and Chain(be). So
we have SibSubTW
(
Bmax−1 , c−1
)
= SibSubTW(Bmax, c−1). (Bmax and Bmax−1 only differs at block be.) Recalling
that Bmin = Bmin−1 and f = ⊥, we have
Adv(S−1, c−1)−Adv(S, c) = SubTW
(
Bmin−1 ∪ {f−1}, c
)− SubTW(Bmin ∪ {f}, c) ≤ ηw.
Thus Adv(S, c) ≥ Adv(S−1, c−1) − ηw > 0. Since P (S,b) 6= ⊥, we have b ∈ C. Since c−1  Tip(C−1),
Adv(S, c−1) > 0 and c−1.parent = b, c−1 should also belong to C according to our rule in maintaining chain C.
This contradicts to c = ⊥.
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So in this case, there must be Adv(S−1, c−1) ≤ ηw. And thus
Padv(S, c)− Padv(S−1, c−1) ≤ −sh − sm + Adv(S−1, c−1) + sh ≤ ηw − sm.
Case 3: c−1 = ⊥ and c = ⊥.
In this case, Padv(S, c)− Padv(S−1, c−1) = 0 < ηw. 
Lemma A.17 If e.type = Arvl, e.block.weight = ηw, f−1 = e.block and f = ⊥, we have
P (S, c)− P (S−1, c−1) = 0.
Proof. Let be := e.block. According to lemma A.9, we have C−1 = C if e.type = Arvl, f−1 = e.block and f = ⊥.
So
c−1 = c.
Since e is the Arvl event of f−1 and f = ⊥, we have Bmin−1 ∪ {f−1} = Bmin ∪ {f}. Since be.weight = ηw
and SubT
(
B∆, c
) ∩ N only contains honest blocks with block weight 1, we have SubT(B∆−1, c−1) ∩ N−1 =
SubT
(
B∆, c
) ∩N. So in this case,
P (S, c)− P (S−1, c−1) = 0.

A.3.3 The third component
Recalling that the third component of potential value is defined as follows. Let c = Next(C,b),
Psp(S,b) :=
{
TotalW(SubT
(
B∆, c
) ∩M\S) c 6= ⊥
0 c = ⊥
Here we define another intermediate potential value for the third component. Let c−1 = Next(C−1,b),
P ′sp(S,S−1,b) :=
{
TotalW(SubT
(
B∆, c−1
) ∩M\S−1) c−1 6= ⊥
TotalW(SubT
(
B∆,b
) ∩M\S−1) c−1 = ⊥
Lemma A.18 If e.type = mGen and one of the following properties hold,
• c−1 6= ⊥ and c−1  e.block
• c−1 = ⊥ and b  e.block
then we have
P ′sp(S,S−1,b)− Psp(S−1,b) ≤ e.block.weight.
For all the other cases,
P ′sp(S,S−1,b)− Psp(S−1,b) ≤ 0.
Proof. Let be = e.block. In this proof, we try to figure out the cases with P ′sp(S,S−1,b)− Psp(S−1,b) > 0.
Case 1: c−1 = ⊥.
In this case, we have b = Tip(C−1). According to claim 4.6, SubT
(
B∆−1,b
) ∩M−1 ⊆ S−1. Since M and
M−1 only differs at blocks which have not been generated when the adversary state is S−1, we have SubT
(
B∆−1,b
)∩
M−1 = SubT
(
B∆−1,b
) ∩M.
P ′sp(S,S−1,b)− Psp(S−1,b)
=TotalW(SubT
(
B∆,b
) ∩M\S−1)
≤TotalW ((SubT(B∆,b) ∩M) \ (SubT(B∆−1,b) ∩M))
=TotalW(SubT
(
B∆\B∆−1,b
) ∩M)
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SubT
(
B∆\B∆−1,b
)∩M 6= ∅ only if e.type = mRls and b  be. Since B∆ andB∆−1 can only differ at block be, we
have
P ′sp(S,S−1,b)− Psp(S−1,b) ≤ be.weight.
Case 2: c−1 6= ⊥.
Since M and M−1 only differs at blocks which have not been generated when the adversary state is S−1, we have
SubT
(
B∆−1, c−1
) ∩M−1 = SubT(B∆−1, c−1) ∩M.
P ′sp(S,S−1,b)− Psp(S−1,b)
=TotalW(SubT
(
B∆, c−1
) ∩M\S−1)− TotalW(SubT(B∆−1, c−1) ∩M\S−1)
≤TotalW(SubT(B∆\B∆−1, c−1) ∩M\S−1)
≤TotalW(SubT(B∆\B∆−1, c−1) ∩M).
Similar with case 1, SubT
(
B∆\B∆−1, c−1
) ∩M 6= ∅ only if e.type = mRls and b  be. And we have
P ′sp(S,S−1,b)− Psp(S−1,b) ≤ be.weight.
As a summary, P ′sp(S,S−1,b)−Psp(S−1,b) ≤ be.weight always holds. And P ′sp(S,S−1,b)−Psp(S−1,b) > 0
only if c−1 6= ⊥ ∧ c−1  be or c−1 = ⊥ ∧ b  be. 
Lemma A.19 If c−1 6= ⊥ and c = ⊥, we have
(Psp(S,b) + v)− (P ′sp(S,S−1,b) + v−1) ≤ sm.
For other cases,
(Psp(S,b) + v)− (P ′sp(S,S−1,b) + v−1) ≤ 0.
Proof. We prove this lemma under four cases partitioned by whether c = ⊥ and whether c−1 = ⊥. According to
claim 4.6.1, we have v − v−1 ≤ TotalW(S\S−1).
Case 1: c−1 = ⊥ and c = ⊥.
In this case, according to claim 4.6.4, we have SubT
(
B∆,Tip(C)
) ∩ M ⊆ S. Since c−1 = ⊥, we have
Tip(C) = b. Thus
(Psp(S,b) + v)− (P ′sp(S,S−1,b) + v−1)
=v − v−1 − TotalW(SubT
(
B∆,b
) ∩M\S−1)
≤v − v−1 − TotalW(S\S−1)
≤0.
Case 2: c−1 6= ⊥ and c = ⊥.
According to claim 4.6.2, we have v − v−1 ≤ sm. Thus
(Psp(S,b) + v)− (P ′sp(S,S−1,b) + v−1)
=v − v−1 − TotalW(SubT
(
B∆, c−1
) ∩M\S)
≤sm.
Case 3: c−1 = ⊥ and c 6= ⊥.
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According to claim 4.6.4, we have S−1 ⊆ S and S\S−1 ⊆ SubT
(
B∆,Tip(C)
) ∩M. Since c ∈ C, we have
SubT
(
B∆,Tip(C)
) ⊆ SubT(B∆, c). Thus
(Psp(S,b) + v)− (P ′sp(S,S−1,b) + v−1)
=v − v−1 + TotalW(SubT
(
B∆, c
) ∩M\S)− TotalW(SubT(B∆,b) ∩M\S−1)
≤v − v−1 + TotalW(SubT
(
B∆, c
) ∩M\S)− TotalW(SubT(B∆, c) ∩M\S−1)
=v − v−1 − TotalW(SubT
(
B∆, c
) ∩M ∩ (S\S−1))
=v − v−1 − TotalW(S\S−1)
≤0.
Case 4: c−1 6= ⊥ and c 6= ⊥. It will be c = c−1. For the same reason as case 3, we have
(Psp(S,b) + v)− (P ′sp(S,S−1,b) + v−1)
=v − v−1 + TotalW(SubT
(
B∆, c
) ∩M\S)− TotalW(SubT(B∆, c) ∩M\S−1)
≤0.

A.3.4 Collect the case discussions
Now we collect the previous results and gives the upper bound for block potential value P (S,b)−P (S−1,b). Similar
with the discussion in the second and the third component, we define an intermediate block potential value as
P ′(S,S−1,b) := Pwith(S,b) + Padv(S, c−1) + P ′sp(S,S−1,b).
Lemma A.20 If f = f−1, we have
P ′(S,S−1,b)− P (S−1,b) ≤ ∆(S−1, e).
Proof. First, we define
P∆with := Pwith(S,b)− Pwith(S−1,b),
P∆1adv := Padv(S, c−1)− Padv(S−1, c−1),
P∆1sp := P
′
sp(S,S−1,b)− Psp(S−1,b).
Thus we have
P ′(S,S−1,b)− P (S−1,b) = P∆with + P∆1adv + P∆1sp
With the assumption f−1 = f , we category all the possible cases for e as follows.
• Case 1: e.type = mGen.
• Case 2: e.type = Arvl.
• Case 3.1: e.type = mRls, c−1 6= ⊥ and e.block ∈ SubT(Bmax,b)\SubT(Bmax, c−1).
• Case 3.2: e.type = mRls, c−1 6= ⊥ and e.block ∈ SubT(Bmax, c−1).
• Case 3.3: e.type = mRls, c−1 = ⊥ and e.block ∈ SubT(Bmax,b).
• Case 3.4: e.type = mRls and e.block /∈ SubT(Bmax,b).
• Case 4.1: e.type = hGenRls and e.block.weight = 0.
• Case 4.2: e.type = hGenRls and e.block.weight = 1.
• Case 4.3: e.type = hGenRls, e.block.weight = ηw and Spe(S−1) = True.
• Case 4.4: e.type = hGenRls, e.block.weight = ηw and Spe(S−1) = False. According to our rule in updating
flag block, if f−1 = f in this case, there must be f−1 = f = ⊥ and that B∆−1 has an honest block with block
weight ηw.
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Let w := e.block.weight.
P∆with P
∆1
adv P
∆1
sp ∆(S−1, e)
Case 1 w 0 0 w
Case 2 0 0 0 0
Case 3.1 −w w 0 0
Case 3.2 −w 0 w 0
Case 3.3 −w 0 w 0
Case 3.4 0 0 0 0
Case 4.1 0 0 0 0
Case 4.2 0 −1 0 −1
Case 4.3 0 0 0 0
Case 4.4 0 0 0 0
Table 1: The upper bounds for each component under different cases (Lemma A.20)
Table 1 shows the upper bounds for P∆with, P
∆1
adv and P
∆1
sp under difference cases. w denotes e.block.weight. The
upper bounds for P∆with follow lemma A.11. The upper bounds for P
∆1
adv follow lemma A.13 except case 4.2, which
follows lemma A.12. The upper bounds for P∆1sp follow lemma A.18. The last column shows ∆(S−1, e) under different
cases. For each case (each row in the table), we can check that
P∆with + P
∆1
adv + P
∆1
sp ≤ ∆(S−1, e).

Lemma A.21 If f−1 = f , we have
(P (S,b) + v)− (P ′(S,S−1,b) + v−1) ≤ 0.
Proof. First we define
P∆2adv := Padv(S, c)− Padv(S, c−1),
P∆2sp := (P (S,b) + v)− (P ′(S,S−1,b) + v−1).
If c−1 6= ⊥ and c = ⊥, we have P∆2adv ≤ −sm (lemma A.14) and P∆2sp ≤ sm (lemma A.19).
For the other cases, we have P∆2adv ≤ 0 (lemma A.14) and P∆2sp ≤ 0 (lemma A.19).
Thus we have
P (S,b)− P ′(S,S−1,b) = P∆2adv + P∆2sp ≤ 0.

Lemma A.22 If f−1 6= f , we have
(P (S,b) + v)− (P ′(S,S−1,b) + v−1) ≤ ∆(S−1, e).
Proof. First we define
P∆with := Pwith(S,b)− Pwith(S−1,b),
P∆adv := Padv(S, c)− Padv(S−1, c−1),
P∆1sp := P
′
sp(S,S−1,b)− Padv(S−1,b),
P∆2sp := (Psp(S,b) + v)− (P ′sp(S,S−1,b) + v−1).
According to our rule in updating flag block, if f−1 6= f , e has three possible cases.
40
A.4 Case discussions for potential value (Part 2) A POTENTIAL VALUES
• Case 1: e.type = hGenRls, e.block.weight = ηw, f−1 = ⊥ and f = e.block. According to lemma A.9, in this
case, it cannot be c−1 6= ⊥ ∧ c = ⊥.
• Case 2: e.type = hGenRls, e.block.weight = ηw, f−1 6= ⊥ and f = ⊥. Notice that f−1 ∈ B∆−1 is an honest
block with block weight ηw.
• Case 3: e.type = Arvl, e.block.weight = ηw, f−1 = e.block and f = ⊥. According to lemma A.9, in this case,
we have C−1 = C and thus c−1 = c.
P∆with P
∆
adv P
∆1
sp P
∆2
sp ∆(S−1, e)
Case: 1 0 2sh + 2sm − ηw 0 0 2sh + 2sm − ηw
Case: 2 0 ηw 0 sm ηw + sm
Case: 3 0 0 0 0 0
Table 2: The upper bounds for each component under different cases (Lemma A.22)
Table 2 shows the upper bounds for P∆with, P
∆
adv, P
∆1
sp and P
∆2
sp under difference cases. The upper bounds for P
∆
with
follow lemma A.11. The upper bounds for P∆adv follow lemma A.15 (case 1), lemma A.16 (case 2) and lemma A.17
(case 3). The upper bounds for P∆1sp follow lemma A.18. The upper bounds for P
∆2
sp follow lemma A.19. The last
column shows ∆(S−1, e) under different cases. For each case (each row in the table), we can check that
P∆with + P
∆
adv + P
∆1
sp + P
∆2
sp ≤ ∆(S−1, e).

Now we reach the result for the section A.3.
Lemma A.23 For any adversary state S appearing in the execution of ghast protocol, let S−1 be the last adversary
state and e be the event updates S−1 to S. For any block b, if P (S−1,b) 6= ⊥ and P (S,b) 6= ⊥, we have
(P (S,b) + v)− (P (S−1,b) + v−1) ≤ ∆(S−1, e).
Proof. If f−1 = f , we haveP ′(S,S−1,b)−P (S,b−1) ≤ ∆(S−1, e) (lemma A.20) and (P (S,b)+v)−(P ′(S,S−1,b)+
v−1) ≤ 0 (lemma A.21). If f−1 6= f , we have (P (S,b) + v) − (P (S−1,b) + v−1) ≤ ∆(S−1, e) (lemma A.22). So
we always have
(P (S,b) + v)− (P (S−1,b) + v−1) ≤ ∆(S−1, e).

A.4 Case discussions for potential value (Part 2)
Common settings For any adversary state S appearing in the execution of ghast protocol, let S−1 be the last adver-
sary state and e be the event updates S−1 to S. In this sub-section, we study the upper bound of block potential value
for the case not covered in section A.3. If P (S−1,b) = ⊥ and P (S,b) 6= ⊥, we can not estimate the upper bound of
P (S,b) by P (S,b)− P (S−1,b). We try to estimate P (S,b) by P (S,b)− P (S−1,Tip(C−1)) instead.
In this sub-section, we assume P (S−1,b) = ⊥, P (S,b) 6= ⊥ and Old(Bmin−1 ,b) = True. All the lemmas in
section A.4 are discussed under these assumptions. We will not repeat them in each lemma (except lemma A.28).
We define symbol c := Next(C,b) for given C and b in the context. According to lemma A.8, one of C−1 and
C must be the prefix of another. Since P (S−1,b) = ⊥ and Old(Bmin−1 ,b) = True, we have b /∈ C−1. Since b ∈ C,
C−1 must be a prefix of C and it is strictly shorter than C. It must be
Tip(C−1) ≺ b  Tip(C).
According to lemma A.9, we have the following claims. All the proofs will refer this claim implicitly.
Claim A.24 Under the common assumption of section A.4, there could be one of following two cases for event e.
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• e.type = Arvl and f−1 = f
• e = hGenRls, f−1 = ⊥ and f = e.block
Lemma A.25 Pwith(S,b)− Pwith(S,Tip(C−1)) ≤ 0.
Proof. Since e.type /∈ {mGen,mRls}, it can be verified that Bgen−1\Bmax−1 = Bgen\Bmax. Thus Pwith(S,Tip(C−1)) =
Pwith(S−1,Tip(C−1)). Since Tip(C−1) ≺ b, SubT
(
Bgen−1\Bmax−1 ,b
) ⊆ SubT(Bgen−1\Bmax−1 ,Tip(C−1)). So we have
Pwith(S,b)− Pwith(S,Tip(C−1)) ≤ 0.

Lemma A.26 If e = hGenRls, f−1 = ⊥ and f = e.block, we have
Padv(S, c)− Padv(S−1,⊥) ≤ 2sh + 2sm − ηw.
If e.type = Arvl and f−1 = f , we have
Padv(S, c)− Padv(S−1,⊥) ≤ 0.
Proof. We discuss two cases respectively.
Case 1: e = hGenRls, f−1 = ⊥ and f = e.block. Let be := e.block. If e.type = hGenRls, f−1 = ⊥ and
f = e.block, according to lemma A.7, for all the block b′ in Chain(be), we have Adv(S,b′) > ηw−sh−sm ≥ sh+sm.
According to claim 4.5.3, Chain(be) is a prefix of C. Since be /∈ Bmin, be cannot be an old enough block and thus
P (S,be) = ⊥. So b cannot be the last block in C. We claim
c 6= ⊥ and c ∈ C.
Since c ∈ C, according to lemma A.7, Adv(S, c) ≥ ηw − sh − sm. Thus
Padv(S, c)− Padv(S−1,⊥) ≤ sh + sm −Adv(S, c) ≤ 2sh + 2sm − ηw.
Case 2: e = Arvl and f−1 = f .
If c = ⊥, then Padv(S, c)− Padv(S−1,⊥) = 0 holds trivially.
If c 6= ⊥, since c ∈ C and Tip(C−1) ≺ b ≺ c, according to claim 4.5.1, Adv(S, c) > sh + sm. Thus
Padv(S, c)− Padv(S−1,⊥) ≤ sh + sm −Adv(S, c) < 0.

Lemma A.27 (Psp(S,b) + v)− (Psp(S−1,Tip(C−1)) + v−1) ≤ 0.
Proof. Since Next(C−1,Tip(C−1)) = ⊥, we have Psp(S,Tip(C−1)) = v−1. According to claim 4.6,
SubT
(
B∆−1,Tip(C−1)
) ∩M−1 ⊆ S−1.
If e.type = hGenRls, since be is not malicious block, SubT
(
B∆−1,Tip(C−1)
) ∩M−1 must equal to
SubT
(
B∆,Tip(C−1)
) ∩ M. If e.type = Arvl, then B∆ ⊆ B∆−1, we have SubT(B∆,Tip(C−1)) ∩ M−1 ⊆
SubT
(
B∆−1,Tip(C−1)
) ∩M. Recalling that Tip(C−1) ≺ Tip(C),
SubT
(
B∆,Tip(C)
) ∩M ⊆ SubT(B∆,Tip(C−1)) ∩M ⊆ S−1.
According to the rule in updating S, we have S = S−1 ∪ SubT
(
B∆,Tip(C)
) ∩M = S−1. Thus v − v−1 = 0
according to claim 4.6.3.
If c = ⊥, we have
(Psp(S,b) + v)− (Psp(S−1,Tip(C−1)) + v−1) = 0.
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If c 6= ⊥, since Tip(C−1) ≺ c, we have
SubT
(
B∆, c
) ∩M ⊆ SubT(B∆,Tip(C−1)) ∩M ⊆ S−1.
Thus
(Psp(S,b) + v)− (Psp(S−1,Tip(C−1)) + v−1) = TotalW(SubT
(
B∆, c
) ∩M\S−1) = 0.

Lemma A.28 For any adversary state S appearing in the execution of ghast protocol, let S−1 be the last adversary
state and e be the event updates S−1 to S. For any block b with P (S−1,b) = ⊥, P (S,b) 6= ⊥ and Old(Bmin−1 ,b) =
True, we have
(P (S,b) + v)− (P (S−1,Tip(C−1)) + v−1) ≤ ∆(S−1, e).
Proof. First we define
P∆with := Pwith(S,b)− Pwith(S−1,Tip(C−1)),
P∆adv := Padv(S, c)− Padv(S−1,⊥),
P∆sp := (Psp(S,b) + v)− (Psp(S−1,Tip(C−1)) + v−1).
Then we have
(P (S,b) + v)− (P (S−1,Tip(C−1)) + v−1) = P∆with + P∆adv + P∆sp .
According two claim A.24, we have two possible cases
Case 1: e.type = Arvl and f−1 = f
In this case, we have ∆(S−1, e) = 0. According to lemma A.25, A.26 and A.27, we have P∆with ≤ 0, P∆adv ≤ 0 and
P∆sp ≤ 0. So we claim
P∆with + P
∆
adv + P
∆
sp ≤ ∆(S−1, e).
Case 2: e = hGenRls, f−1 = ⊥ and f = e.block In this case, we have ∆(S−1, e) = 2sh + 2sm − ηw. According
to lemma A.25, A.26 and A.27, we have P∆with ≤ 0, P∆adv ≤ 2sh + 2sm − ηw and P∆sp ≤ 0. So we claim
P∆with + P
∆
adv + P
∆
sp ≤ ∆(S−1, e).

A.5 Proof of Theorem 4.7
Proof. For any n ≥ N(r1), we have assumed the following two conditions.
• P˜ (Sn,BminN(r0)) < −ηw
• For any block b ∈ Bgenn with BminN(r0) * b.past, it will be Old(Bminn ,b) = True.
Let b′n ∈ Cn be the last block satisfying BminN(r0) * b′n.past in Cn. According to the second assumption,
Old(Bminn ,b
′
n) = True. According to the definition of global potential value, the block potential value of all the
blocks in Chain(b′n) are taken into considered. Thus P˜ (Sn,BminN(r0)) ≥ maxb∈Chain(b′n) P (Sn,b). So we have
P (Sn,b′n) < −ηw. According to the definition of block potential value, P (Sn,b′n) < 0 only if b′n 6= Tip(Cn). So
we can let bn := Next(Cn,b′n). Since b
′
n is the last block satisfying B
min
N(r0)
* b′n.past, there must be BminN(r0) ⊆
bn.past.
Notice that maxb∈Chain(b′n) P (Sn,b) ≤ P˜ (Sn,BminN(r0)) < −ηw, thus we have
∀b ∈ Chain(b′n), P (Sn,b) < −ηw.
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Since P (Sn,b) ≥ −Adv(Sn,Next(Cn,b)), we have
∀b ∈ Chain(bn)\{g}, Adv(Sn,b) < −ηw.
Since
Adv(Sn,b) =SubTW
(
Bminn ∪ {fn},b
)− SibSubTW(Bmaxn ,b)
≤ηw + SubTW
(
Bminn ,b
)− SibSubTW(Bmaxn ,b),
we have
∀b ∈ Chain(bn)\{g},SubTW
(
Bminn ,b
)− SibSubTW(Bmaxn ,b) > 0.
According to lemma A.1, bn ∈ Pivot(B) for all the local state Bminn ⊆ B ⊆ Bmaxn . It means that for any honest
participant, bn is in its pivot chain. Since BminN(r0) ⊆ bn.past, for any block b˜ ∈ BminN(r0), its history is determined by
block bn. Formally, Prefix(C(B), b˜) is a prefix of C(bn.past).
Then we will show that for any n ≥ N(r1), bn and bn+1 are the same block. Since bn and bn+1 is the first block
b′ satisfying BminN(r0) ⊆ b′.past in Cn and Cn+1. So there can not be bn ≺ bn+1 or bn+1 ≺ bn. According to
lemma A.8, one of Cn and Cn+1 must be the prefix of another, thus there must be bn = bn+1.
So for all the n ≥ N(r1), block bn refers the same block and it is in the pivot chain of all the honest participants.
According to the block ordering algorithm CGHAST (recalling that CGHAST is defined the same as CTG except the block
weight), the history of blocks in bn.past must be a prefix of C(bn.past). Notice that BminN(r0) ⊆ bn.past, we have
∀b˜ ∈ BminN(r0),
∣∣∣∣∣⋃r∈{r1,··· ,rmax}B∈Ur Prefix(CGHAST(B), b˜)
∣∣∣∣∣ = 1.

A.6 Proof of Theorem 4.8
Proof. Combining the conclusions in lemma A.23 and lemma A.28, we proved this lemma. 
A.7 Proof of Theorem 4.9
Proof. Recalling that P˜ (S,B) picks the maximum block potential value of blocks in C′ := {b′ ∈ C|B * b′.past}.
Since genesis block g must be in C′ and Old(Bmin−1 ,g) = True, there must exists block in C
′ whose block potential
value is not ⊥. Let b be the block with maximum block potential value in C′. (A.k.a. b := arg maxb′∈C′ P (S,b′)).
Thus
P˜ (S,B) = P (S,b).
Since P (S,b) 6= ⊥, we have Old(Bmin,b) = True. In the assumptions of this theorem, Old(Bmin,b′) =
False ∨Old(Bmin−1 ,b′) = True ∨ P˜ (S,B) = P (S,b′) holds for all the block b′ ∈ C′. So we have
Old(Bmin−1 ,b) = True.
Since Old(Bmin−1 ,b) = True, it must be b ∈ Bmin−1 . Thus b.past ⊆ Bmin−1 ⊆ Bmax−1 . Since we assumeBmax−1 ∩B−1 =
Bmax−1 ∩ B, thus b.past ∩ B = b.past ∩ B−1. If B−1 ⊆ b.past, then it will be B ⊆ b.past and thus b /∈ C′. This
contradicts b ∈ C′. Thus we have
B−1 * b.past.
Case 1: P (S−1,b) 6= ⊥.
Since P (S−1,b) 6= ⊥ and b ∈ C−1, we have b ∈ C′−1. Recalling that P˜ (S−1,B−1) picks the maximum
block potential value of blocks in C′−1 := {b′ ∈ C−1|b′.past * B−1}, there must be P (S−1,b) ≤ P˜ (S−1,B−1).
According to lemma A.23, (P (S,b) + v)− (P (S−1,b) + v−1) ≤ ∆(S−1, e). Thus
(P˜ (S,B) + v)− (P˜ (S−1,B−1) + v−1) ≤ (P (S,b) + v)− (P (S−1,b) + v−1) ≤ ∆(S−1, e).
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Case 2: P (S−1,b) = ⊥.
Since P (S−1,b) = ⊥ and Old(Bmin−1 ,b) = True, we have b /∈ C−1. According to lemma A.8,Cmust be a prefix
of C−1. Thus Tip(C−1) ≺ b. So we have Tip(C−1).past ⊆ b.past. Thus
B−1 * Tip(C−1).past.
Recalling that P˜ (S−1,B−1) picks the maximum block potential value of blocks inC′−1 := {b′ ∈ C−1|b′.past *
B−1}, there must beP (S−1,Tip(C−1)) ≤ P˜ (S−1,B−1).According to lemma A.28, (P (S,b)+v)−(P (S−1,Tip(C−1))+
v−1) ≤ ∆(S−1, e). Thus
(P˜ (S,B) + v)− (P˜ (S−1,B−1) + v−1) ≤ (P (S,b) + v)− (P (S−1,Tip(C−1)) + v−1) ≤ ∆(S−1, e).

B The Summation of Event Values
B.1 Decompose Event Values
The definition of potential value is not friendly for analysis probability distribution, we elaborate the decomposition
of the event value into several components: ∆H(S−1, e), ∆M(S−1, e), ∆F(S−1, e) and ∆T(S−1, e). And shows that
the event value is always no more than the sum of components in lemma B.1.
• When e is a mGen event, ∆M(S−1, e) := e.block.weight. For other cases, ∆M(S−1, e) := 0.
• When e is a hGenRls event and Spe(S−1) = False, ∆H(S−1, e) := −(ηw − 2sh − 2sm)/ηw · e.block.weight.
For other cases. It equals to 0 for other cases.
• ∆F(S−1, e) := 2ηw − 2sh − sm if e is an hGenRls event of block with block weight ηw and B∆−1 has an honest
block with block weight ηw. It equals to 0 for other cases.
• ∆T(S−1, e) := −sm if e is an hGenRls event of block with block weight ηw and B∆−1 has at least two honest
blocks with block weight ηw. It equals to 0 for other cases.
Lemma B.1 For any adversary state S appearing in the execution of ghast protocol, let S−1 be the last adversary
state and e be the event updates S−1 to S. We have
∆(S−1, e) ≤ ∆M(S−1, e) + ∆H(S−1, e) + ∆F(S−1, e) + ∆T(S−1, e).
Proof. For the case e.type ∈ {mRls,Arvl}, the event value and all its components always be 0. So the inequality holds
trivially.
If e.type = mGen, the event value components ∆H,∆F,∆T are all 0. So we have ∆(S−1, e) = e.block.weight =
∆M(S−1, e).
If e.type = hGenRls and e.block.weight = 0, the event value and all its components must be 0.
If e.type = hGenRls and e.block.weight = 1, the event value components ∆M,∆F,∆T are all 0. When Spe(S−1, e) =
False, we have ∆(S−1, e) = −1 and ∆H(S−1, e) = −1 + (2sh + 2sm)/ηw ≥ −1. When Spe(S−1, e) = True, we
have ∆(S−1, e) = 0 and ∆H(S−1, e) = 0. So the inequality holds for this case.
If e.type = hGenRls and e.block.weight = ηw, there must be ∆M(S−1, e) = 0. Table 3 lists the value of
∆H(S−1, e), ∆F(S−1, e), ∆T(S−1, e) and ∆(S−1, e) under all the possible cases. We can check that ∆H(S−1, e) +
∆F(S−1, e) + ∆T(S−1, e) ≥ ∆(S−1, e) holds for all the cases.

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Let w1 := 2sm + 2sh − ηw and w2 := 2ηw − 2sh − sm.
∆H ∆F ∆T ∆
|H−1| = 0 1
Spe(S−1) = False w1 0 0 w1
Spe(S−1) = True 0 0 0 0
|H−1| = 1 1
f = ⊥ ≥ w1 w2 0 0
f 6= ⊥ ≥ w1 w2 0 ηw + sm
|H−1| ≥ 2 1
f = ⊥ ≥ w1 w2 −sm 0
f 6= ⊥ Impossible 2
1. LetH−1 includes all the honest blocks inB∆−1 with block weight ηw.
2. If f 6= ⊥, there must be |H−1| = 1 according to our rule in updating flag block.
Table 3: Event value and its components under different cases.
B.2 Probability for each Component
Recalling that ~η := (ηd, ηw, ηa, ηt, ηb) and (m,β, d,A,Z) admissible w.r.t. (Π~ηGHAST, CGHAST) in our analysis.
View(ΠGHAST,CGHAST)(Z,A, κ) is the random variable denote the joint view of all the participant nodes and the adversary
in all rounds. We denote it as View in section B.2. Now we define several random variables determined by View. Let
Viewr denote the joint view before round r.
Let en denote the nth event since the ghast protocol launched and Sn−1 denote the adversary state when event en
happens. Similarly, symbols Bgenn , B
max
n , B
min
n , B
∆
n , Mn, fn, Cn, Sn, vn denote corresponding components of Sn in
the context for any subscript. For any round r, let N(r) be the index of last event before round r. We define random
variables Mr, Hr, Fr as follows:
Mr :=
N(r+1)∑
i=N(r)+1
∆M(Si−1, ei) Hr :=
N(r+1)∑
i=N(r)+1
∆H(Si−1, ei) Fr :=
N(r+1)∑
i=N(r)+1
∆F(Si−1, ei) (16)
For the case no event happens in round r, it will be N(r) = N(r+ 1), so all the three random variables equal to 0
in this case.
We use valued random variable Sr to denote if there exists an adversary state S with Spe(S) = True in phase 3
of round r. Futhermore, we use boolean-valued random variables SMr , S
H1
r , S
H2
r to distinguish the reason in triggering
special status. SMr denotes there exists adversary state S in phase 3 or round r which satisfies the first rule in the
definition of special status (definition 4.2). SH1r and S
H2
r correspond to the second rule and the third rule. The random
variables equal to 1 for the “True” statement and equal to 0 otherwise.
Claim B.2 For any given round r, Sr ≤ SH1r + SH2r + SMr .
Lemma B.3 For any given round r1 < r2, we have
(vN(r2) − vN(r1))/sm ≥
r2−1∑
i=r1
SMi /(d+ 1)− 1.
Proof. For any round r with SMr = 1, we have adversary state Sn with N(r) < n ≤ N(r + 1) such that
TotalW(SubT
(
B∆n ,Tip(Cn)
) ∩Mn) ≥ sm.
Let Tn := SubT
(
B∆n ,Tip(Cn)
)
. According to claim 4.6, we have Tn ∩Mn ⊆ Sn. Since B∆n only contains blocks
generated no earlier than round r− d+ 1. Let n′ = N(r− d), we haveB∆n ∩Bgenn′ = ∅. Thus (Tn ∩Mn)∩Sn′ = ∅.
So we have
TotalW(Sn\Sn′) ≥ sm.
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According to claim 4.6, TotalW(Si+1\Si) ≤ min{sm, vi+1 − vi} and Si ⊆ Si+1 and vi − vi−1 ≥ 0 hold for all
the i. So we have
TotalW(Sn\Sn′) ≤
N(r+1)∑
i=N(r−d)+1
TotalW(Si\Si−1)
≤
N(r+1)∑
i=N(r−d)+1
min{sm, vi − vi−1}
≤min{sm, vN(r+1) − vN(r−d)}
Thus we claim vN(r+1) − vN(r−d) ≥ sm holds if SMr = 1. Recalling that vi is non-decreasing in terms of i, we
have
r2−1∑
i=r1+d
SMi ≤
(
r2−1∑
i=r1+d
vN(i+1) − vN(i−d)
)
/sm
≤(d+ 1)/sm ·
(
vN(r2) − vN(r1)
)
The rest part
∑r1+d−1
i=r1
SMi ≤ d holds trivially. Thus
(vN(r2) − vN(r1))/sm ≥
r2−1∑
i=r1
SMi /(d+ 1)− 1.

Lemma B.4 For any given round r1 < r2, we have
N(r2)∑
i=N(r1)+1
−∆T(Si−1, ei)/sm ≥
r2−1∑
j=r1
SH2j /(d+ 1)− 1.
Proof. For any round r with SH2r = 1, we have adversary state Sn with N(r) < n ≤ N(r + 1) such that B∆n contain
at least three honest blocks with block weight ηw. Suppose event en′ be the latest hGenRls event of these three blocks.
SoB∆n′−1 contain at least two honest blocks with block weight ηw. Thus ∆T(B
∆
n′−1, en′) = −sm. Since all the blocks
in B∆n should be generated no earlier than round r− d+ 1, we have n′ > N(r− d). Recalling that ∆T(Si−1, ei) ≤ 0
for all i, we have
SH2r ≤
N(r+1)∑
i=N(r−d)+1
−∆T(Si−1, ei)/sm.
Thus we have
r2−1∑
i=r1
SH2i =
r1+d−1∑
i=r1
SH2i +
r2−1∑
i=r1+d
SH2i
≤d+
r2−1∑
i=r1+d
N(i+1)∑
j=N(i−d)+1
−∆T(Si−1, ei)/sm
≤d+ (d+ 1) ·
N(r2)∑
i=N(r1)+1
−∆T(Si−1, ei)/sm.

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Lemma B.5 For any round r1 < r2, let u := (ηw − 2sm − 2sh)/ηw, p1(t) = exp
(
(etηw−1)·βm
ηwηd
)
, p2(t) =
exp
(
(e−tuηw−1)·(1−β)m
ηwηd
)
, p3(t) = exp(−tsm/(d + 1)) and p(t) := p1(t) · max{p2(t), p3(t)}. For any round r,
let Xr := Mr +Hr − sm/(d+ 1) · Sr. For any t > 0, any Viewr and any k ∈ R, we have
Pr
[
r2−1∑
i=r1
Xi ≥ k
∣∣∣∣∣Viewr1
]
≤ p(t)r2−r1/etk.
and
Pr
[
r2−1∑
i=r1
Mi ≥ k
∣∣∣∣∣Viewr1
]
≤ p1(t)r2−r1/etk.
Proof. Let View′r denote the joint view in View before the phase 3 of round r. For any r ≥ r1 and t > 0, we have the
following discussion.
In phase 3 of round r, suppose the adversary queries the oracle H(·) x1 times with the block bnew satisfying
Adapt(bnew.past) = False and queries the oracle x2 times the block bnew satisfying Adapt(bnew.past) = True.
(Note that bnew is not a valid block. But its past set bnew.past is fixed before querying random oracle.) Since we only
allow adversary control βm malicious nodes, x1 + x2 ≤ βm.
For any given x1, x2 and View′, let Ai (i ∈ [x1]) and Bj (j ∈ [x2]) denote the block weight if the adversary finds
a solution to make the block valid and equals to 0 otherwise. So
M =
∑
i∈[x1]
Ai +
∑
j∈[x2]
Bj .
Bj corresponds to the queries satisfying Adapt(bnew.past) = True. So Bj = ηw with probability 1/(ηdηw) and
Bi = 0 otherwise. Thus E
[
etBj |View′r, x1, x2
]
= (ηdηw − 1 + e−tηw )/(ηdηw).
Ai corresponds to the queries satisfying Adapt(bnew.past) = False. So Ai = 1 with probability 1/ηd and Ai = 0
otherwise. Thus E
[
etAi |View′r, x1, x2
]
= (ηd − 1 + e−t)/ηd. According to AM-GM inequality, e−tηw/ηw + (ηw −
1)/ηw ≥ e−t. Thus (ηd − 1 + e−t)/ηd ≤ (ηdηw − 1 + e−tηw )/(ηdηw).
Since all the Ai and Bj are independent conditioned on View′r, we have
E
[
etMr
∣∣View′r] ≤ ((ηdηw − 1 + etηw )/(ηdηw))x1+x2 .
Notice that (ηdηw − 1 + etηw )/(ηdηw) ≤ exp((etηw − 1)/(ηdηw)), recalling x1 + x2 ≤ βm, we have
E
[
etMr
∣∣View′r] ≤ exp((etηw − 1)βm/(ηdηw)) = p1(t).
Mr is the sum of block weight for malicious blocks generated in round r. If Sr = 0, then Hr is −u times the sum
of block weight for honest blocks generated in round r. And the sum of block weight is independent with Sr, Similar
with the previous claim, for all the View′r and t > 0,
E
[
etHr
∣∣View′r, Sr = 0] ≤ exp((e−tuηw − 1)(1− β)m/(ηdηw)) = p2(t).
If Sr = 1, we have Hr ≤ 0. Thus
E
[
et(Hr−sm/(d+1)·Sr)
∣∣∣View′r] ≤ max{p2(t), p3(t)}.
Since Mr, Hr, Sr are independent under given View′r, thus for any given r ≥ r1, View′r and t > 0
E
[
etXr
∣∣View′r] ≤ p1(t) ·max{p2(t), p3(t)} = p(t).
When r ≥ r1, Viewr1 and Xi for i ∈ [r1, r) are determined only by View′r. So for any Viewr1 , r ≥ r1, Xi for
i ∈ [r1, r) and t > 0, we have
E
[
etXr
∣∣∣et∑r−1i=r1 Xi ,Viewr1] ≤ p(t).
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Thus
E
[
et
∑r
i=r1
Xi
∣∣∣Viewr1] ≤ p(t) · E [et∑r−1i=r1 Xi∣∣∣Viewr1] .
By induction, we have
E
[
et
∑r2
i=r1
Xi
∣∣∣Viewr1] ≤ p(t)r2−r1 .
According to the Markovs inequality, for any t > 0, any Viewr and any k ∈ R, we have
Pr
[
r2−1∑
i=r1
Xi ≥ k
∣∣∣∣∣Viewr1
]
≤ p(t)r2−r1/etk.
Similarly, since we have E
[
etMr
∣∣View′r] ≤ p1(t), thus
Pr
[
r2−1∑
i=r1
Mi ≥ k
∣∣∣∣∣Viewr1
]
≤ p1(t)r2−r1/etk.

Lemma B.6 For any given round r1 < r2, let q := (1− β)md/(ηwηd), B(n, p) denote the binomial distribution with
experiment times n and success probability p, Y1 follows the probability distribution B((1−β)m(r2−r1), 1/(ηwηd)).
For any Viewr1 , k2 ∈ N and y ∈ N, we have
Pr
[
r2−1∑
i=r1
Fi ≥ k2 · (2ηw − 2sh − sm)
∣∣∣∣∣Viewr1
]
≤ Pr[Y1 ≥ y + 1] + Pr
Y2∼B(y,q)
[Y2 ≥ k2].
Proof. We refer the blocks satisfy Hweight(b.digest) ≥ 2κ/ηw as tagged blocks in this proof. For any given y ∈ N,
let nj (j ∈ [y]) denote the index of the jth hGenRls event of honest tagged block b no earlier than round r1. Let r′j
denote the round index of event nj .
Recalling that only a tagged block can have block weight ηw. If r′y+1 ≥ r2, we claim for any r1 ≤ i < r2,
Fi = 2ηw − 2sh − sm only if there exists nj such that r′j − r′j−1 < d. (We set r′0 = r1.) So we have
∑r2−1
i=r1
Fi ≥
k2 ·(2ηw−2sh−sm) only if there are at least k2 different j ∈ [y] satisfy r′j−r′j−1 < d. For any j ∈ [y], r′j−r′j−1 < d
only if the honest nodes queries oracle H(·) at least (1− β) · dm times between event event enj (included) and event
enj−1 (excluded). It will happens with probability no more than 1−(1−1/(ηwηd))(1−β)md ≤ (1−β)md/(ηwηd) = q
and independent among different j. So we have
Pr
[
r′y+1 ≥ r2 ∧
r2−1∑
i=r1
Fi ≥ k2 · (2ηw − 2sh − sm)
∣∣∣∣∣Viewr1
]
≤ Pr
Y2∼B(y,q)
[Y2 ≥ k2].
Notice that r′y+1 ≥ r2 represents the honest nodes generate at most y tagged blocks between round r1 (included)
and round r2 − 1 (included). The honest blocks query oracle H(·) (1− β) ·m(r2 − r1) times, and find a valid block
satisfies this property with probability 1/(ηwηd) in each query. Thus r′y+1 < r2 holds with probability
Pr
Y1∼B((1−β)m(r2−r1),1/(ηwηd))
[Y1 ≥ y + 1].
Applying the union bound, we have
Pr
[
r2−1∑
i=r1
Fi ≥ k2 · (2ηw − 2sh − sm)
∣∣∣∣∣Viewr1
]
≤ Pr
Y1
[Y1 ≥ y + 1] + Pr
Y2∼B(y,q)
[Y2 ≥ k2].

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Lemma B.7 For any given round r1 < r2, let B(n, p) denote the binomial distribution with experiment times n and
success probability p. For any y ∈ Z+, let dy := dd/ye, Z1 ∼ B((1 − β)m(y + 1)dy, 1/ηd), q := Pr[Z1 ≥ sh],
Z2 ∼ B(d(r2 − r1)/(dy(y + 1))e, q). For any k3 ∈ N and Viewr1 , we have
Pr
[
r2−1∑
i=r1
SH1i ≥ (y + 1) · (k3 + 1) · dy
∣∣∣∣∣Viewr1
]
≤ (y + 1) · Pr[Z2 ≥ k3].
Proof. We divide the rounds in [r1, r2) into several intervals with length dy except the last one. The jth interval is
[r1 + (j − 1) · dy, r1 + j · dy). Let Tj = 1 denote if there exists a round i with SH1i = 1 in the jth interval and Tj = 0
for other cases. Thus
r2−1∑
i=r1
SH1i ≤
d(r2−r1)/dye∑
j=1
dy · Tj .
Since SH1i = 1 only if honest nodes generates at least sh blocks in round (i−d, i]. So we claim Tj = 1 (j ≥ y+1)
only if honest nodes generates at least sh blocks in round [r1 + (j − y − 1) · dy, r1 + j · dy). Since the honest nodes
will query oracle H(·) in (1−β)m(y+ 1) ·dy times during round [r1 + (j− y−1) ·dy, r1 + j ·dy), they will generate
at least sh honest blocks with probability
q = Pr
Z1∼B((1−β)m(y+1)·dy,1/ηd)
[Z1 ≥ sh].
Notice that Tj2 and Tj1 are independent event if j2 − j1 ≥ y + 1. So for any j′ ∈ {0, 1, · · · , y}, we construct a list of
random variables for all the Tj with j ∈ [y + 1, r2 − r1) and j modulo y + 1 equals to j′. The list contains at most
d(r2− r1)/(dy(y+ 1))e independent random variables. So the sum of these random variables is lager or equal k with
probability Pr[Z2 ≥ k3 + 1]. Taking the union bound, we have
Pr
d(r2−r1)/dye∑
j=y+1
Tj ≥ (y + 1)k3
∣∣∣∣∣∣Viewr1
 ≤ (y + 1) Pr[Z2 ≥ k3]
Since
∑y
j=1 Tj < y + 1 holds trivially, we have
Pr
[
r2−1∑
i=r1
SH1i ≥ (y + 1) · (k3 + 1) · dy
∣∣∣∣∣Viewr1
]
≤ (y + 1) · Pr[Z2 ≥ k3].

B.3 Summarize all the Components
Now we summarize the previous lemmas. First we define a function φ(λ, β, ~η, r∆, ρ, sm, sh,~t). ~t is a tuple of four
parameters in R+, which are denoted by t1, t2, t3, t4. λ equals to m(d+ 1)/ηd and r∆ ∈ R+.
f(µ, n) :=
en−µ
(n/µ)n
x1 := e
t1ηw − 1
x2 := e
t1(2sh+2sm−ηw) − 1
k := ρ− (t3 + 1) · (2ηw − 2sh − sm)− 1.02 · sm · (t4 + 2)− 2sm
q1 := exp(r∆ · λ (x1β + x2(1− β)) /ηw − t1k)
q2 := exp(r∆ · (λx1β/ηw − t1sm)− t1k)
q3 := f(r∆ · (1− β)λ/ηw, t2) + f(t2 · (1− β)λ/ηw, t3)
x3 := f(1.02 · λ(1− β), sh)
q4 := 101 · f((r∆ + 1) · x3, t4)
φ(λ, β, ~η, r∆, ρ, sm, sh,~t) := max{q1, q2}+ q3 + q4
(17)
50
B.3 Summarize all the Components B THE SUMMATION OF EVENT VALUES
Lemma B.8 For any given round r1 < r2, let r∆ := (r2 − r1)/(d + 1), λ = m(d + 1)/ηd. When d > 104, for
arbitrary sm ≥ 0, sh ≥ 0 and positive parameters in ~t, we have
Pr
 N(r2)∑
i=N(r1)+1
∆(Si−1, ei)−
(
vN(r2) − vN(r1)
) ≥ ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣Viewr1
 ≤ φ(λ, β, ~η, r∆, ρ, sm, sh,~t).
Proof. This proof inherits symbols in equation (17).
Notice that m/ηd · (r2 − r1) = λ · r∆, for any round r, let Xr := Mr + Hr − sm/(d + 1) · Sr. According to
lemma B.5, we have
Pr
[
r2−1∑
i=r1
Xi ≥ k
∣∣∣∣∣Viewr1
]
≤ max{q1, q2}. (18)
If random variable T is in binomial distribution B(n, p), for any z > np, according to chernoff bound, we have
Pr[T ≥ z] ≤ e
z/(np)−1
(z/(np))z/(np)
= f(np, z).
According to lemma B.6, (let variable k2 in lemma B.6 equals to dt3e and variable y in it equals to bt2c), we have
Pr
[
r2−1∑
i=r1
Fi ≥ (t3 + 1) · (2ηw − 2sh − sm)
∣∣∣∣∣Viewr1
]
≤ q3. (19)
Let variable y in lemma B.7 equals to 100 and variable k3 in it equals to dt4e. Since d > 104, we have dd/100e ·
(100 + 1) ≤ 1.02(d+ 1). According to lemma B.7,
Pr
[
r2−1∑
i=r1
SH1i ≥ 1.02 · (t4 + 2) · (d+ 1)
∣∣∣∣∣Viewr1
]
≤ q4 (20)
Summarize the previous lemmas, we can link the random variables to the summation of event values.
N(r2)∑
i=N(r1)+1
∆(Si−1, ei)
≤
N(r2)∑
i=N(r1)+1
(∆M(Si−1, ei) + ∆H(Si−1, ei) + ∆F(Si−1, ei) + ∆T(Si−1, ei)) Lemma B.1
≤
r2−1∑
i=r1
(
Mi +Hi + Fi − sm
d+ 1
· SH2i
)
+ sm Eq. (16) & Lemma B.4
≤
r2−1∑
i=r1
(
Xi + Fi +
sm
d+ 1
· (SMi + SH1i ))+ sm Claim B.2
≤
r2−1∑
i=r1
(
Xi + Fi +
sm
d+ 1
· SH1i
)
+ 2sm +
(
vN(r2) − vN(r1)
)
Lemma B.3
Since ρ = k + (t3 + 1) · (2ηw − 2sh − sm) + 1.02 · (t4 + 2) + 2sm, according to equations 18, 19 and 20, for the
parameters sm ≥ 0, sh ≥ 0 and t1, t2, t3, t4, we claim
Pr
 N(r2)∑
i=N(r1)+1
∆(Si−1, ei)−
(
vN(r2) − vN(r1)
) ≥ ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣Viewr1
 ≤ max{q1 + q2}+ q3 + q4.
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
We define function φ˜(λ, β, ~η, r∆, ρ) as the minimum value that φ(λ, β, ~η, r∆, ρ, sm, sh,~t) can achieve by picking
parameters sh, sm and ~t. Then we have the following lemma
Lemma B.9 When λ ≥ 0.8 log(500/δ) and ηw = 30λ/δ, for any ε > 0, if
r∆ ≥ max
{
(3 + ρ/ηw) · 600
δ2
, log
(
4
ε
)
· 3000
δ3
, log
(
404
ε
)
· 200
δ
}
,
then
φ˜(λ, β, ~η, r∆, ρ) ≤ ε.
Proof. In this proof, we try to find a feasible solution for φ(λ, β, ~η, r∆,−ρ, sm, sh,~t) < ε. This proof inherits
symbols in equation (17). Let sm = 1.5λ, sh = 3λ and t1 = δ2/(150λ). Then we have x1 = eδ/5 − 1 and
x2 = e
−δ/5·(1−7δ/10) − 1 ≤ (e−δ/5 − 1) · (1− 7δ/10). Thus
λ (x1β + x2(1− β)) /ηw
=
δ
30(2− δ) ·
(
(eδ/5 + e−δ/5 − 2) · (1− 7δ/10)− 0.7δ · (eδ/5 − 1)
)
≤ δ
30(2− δ) ·
(
δ2
25
− 7δ
2
50
)
≤− δ
3
600
So
q1 ≤ exp(−r∆ · δ3/600− t1 · k1).
Since it can be verified that λx1β/ηw ≤ δ2300 and −t1 ∗ sm = − δ
2
100 , so we have
q2 ≤ exp(−r∆ · δ2/150− t1 · k1).
Let t2 =
√
2 · r∆ · (1− β)λ/ηw and t3 =
√
2 · (1− β)λ/ηw · t2, we skim the detailed computation and claim
q3 < 2 exp(−r∆ · (1− β)2δ2/450) < 2 exp(−r∆ · δ2/1800).
Notice that sh ≥ 3 · λ. Thus
x3 ≤ f(1.02 · λ · (1− β), 3 · λ) < exp(−1.25λ) = δ
500
.
Let t4 = 4 · δ/500 · (r∆ + 1), notice that r∆ ≥ log(404) · 200 > 1000, thus r∆ + 1 < 1.001r∆. So we have
q4 < 101 · exp(−r∆ · δ/200).
Notice that t3 = 2(1− β)2λ2/η2w · r∆ ≤ δ2/450 · r∆ and t4 < δ/120. We have
k1 ≥ −ρ− 2ηw · t3 − 1.02smt4 − 3.04sm − 2ηw
≥ −ρ− 2.26ηw − 2ηw · t3 − 1.02smt4
> −ρ− 2.26ηw − r∆ · λ(2δ/15 + δ/60)
> −ρ− 2.26ηw − r∆ · λ · 3δ/20
Applying the lower bound of k1 to q1 and q2, we can get
q1 < exp(−r∆ · δ3/1500 + t1(ρ+ 3ηw))
q2 < exp(−r∆ · 17δ3/3000 + t1(ρ+ 3ηw))
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When r∆ ≥ (3 + ρ/ηw) · 600δ2 , we have t1(ρ + 3ηw) ≤ r∆ · δ3/3000, thus q1 < exp(−r∆ · δ3/3000) and
q2 < exp(−r∆ · 16δ3/3000). Since r∆ ≥ log
(
4
ε
) · 3000δ3 , we have q1 < ε/4, q2 < ε/4 and q3 < ε/2. Since
r∆ ≥ log
(
404
ε
) · 200δ , q4 < ε/4. Thus we have
φ(λ, β, ~η, r∆,−ρ, sm, sh,~t) < ε.

B.4 Proof of Theorem 4.11
Proof. For any given round r1 < r2, let r∆ := (r2 − r1)/(d+ 1). According to lemma B.8, we have
Pr
 N(r2)∑
i=N(r1)+1
∆(Si−1, ei)−
(
vN(r2) − vN(r1)
) ≥ ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣Viewr1
 ≤ φ˜(λ, β, ~η, r∆, ρ).
According to lemma B.9, when λ ≥ 0.8 log(500/δ), ηw = 30λ/δ and
r∆ ≥ max
{
(3 + ρ/ηw) · 600
δ2
, log
(
4
ε
)
· 3000
δ3
, log
(
404
ε
)
· 200
δ
}
,
we have
φ˜(λ, β, ~η, r∆, ρ) ≤ ε.
So this theorem is proved. 
C Timer Chain and Old Enough Blocks
Lemma C.1 Let Bn,r :=
{
b ∈ Bgenn
∣∣∣BminN(r) * b.past ∨ b ∈ BminN(r)}. For any round r and γ ≥ 0, if β ≥ 0.1,
ηt ≥ 2λ/δ and r∆ satisfying
r∆ ≥ ηtηd
m
·max
{
128
δ2
· log(8400
εδ2
),
8(γ + 2)
δ
}
we have
Pr
[∃n ≥ N(r + r∆),MaxTH(Bminn )−MaxTH(Bn,r) ≤ γ] ≤ ε.
Proof. Let δ := 1−β/(1−β), τ := 4√(1− β)/β, z := bηtηd/(mβτ)c, c := (d+1)·m/(ηtηd) and f(x) := ex(1+x)1+x .
Notice that τ ≤ 2 when β ≥ 0.1.
Recalling that N(r) denotes the index of latest event before round r, en denotes the nth event and Sn−1 denotes
the adversary state before event en. Bgenn ,B
max
n ,B
min
n denote the corresponding component in Sn.
For any given round r and positive integer k ∈ Z+ with k ≥ 10, we define real number r+ and random variables
X(r, k) and Y (r, k) as follows
r+ := r + z · k
X(r, k) := MaxTH(BminN(r+))−MaxTH(BmaxN(r))
Y (r, k) := the number of malicious timer blocks generated in rounds [r, r+).
We try to study probability distribution for X(r, k) and Y (r, k). In an admissible environment, if an honest node
generates or receives a block in round r, all the honest nodes will receive such a block before phase 2 of round r + d.
So if an honest node constructs a timer block b1 in round r, for any honest timer block b2 generated no earlier than
round r + d, it will be TimerHeight(b2) ≥ TimerHeight(b1) + 1. We construct an event list as the following steps:
1. Find the first hGenRls event of timer block started with round r + d.
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2. Skip the subsequent (1 − β)md queries for oracle H(·) from honest nodes after this event. (Recall that honest
nodes query this oracle (1− β)m times in each round.) Then find the next hGenRls event of timer block.
3. Repeat step 2 until reaching the end of round r+ − d− 1.
We claim the timer height of the first element in this event list will be no less than MaxTH(BmaxN(r)) + 1. And for
any two consecutive events, the timer height of the latter one must be strict larger than the timer height of the former
one. So MaxTH(BminN(r+))−MaxTH(BmaxN(r)) is no less than the length of this event list.
If X(r, k) ≤ τk, the length of such event list is no larger than τk and at most (1 − β)md · τk queries are
skipped when contracting such event list. So it only happens when honest nodes find at most τk timer blocks in
(r+ − r− (τk+ 2)d+ 1)(1− β)m queries. An honest node will find a valid timer block with probability 1/(ηdηt) in
each query and the outcomes are independent. Notice that
(r+ − r − (τk + 2)d+ 1)(1− β)m
≥
(
ηtηd
mβτ
− (τk + 0.2k)(d+ 1)
)
· (1− β)m
=(1− β)k · ηtηd ·
(
1
βτ
− (τ + 0.2) · c
)
It can be verified that 1/(βτ)−τ
2/(1−β)
τ+0.2 < δ/2. Since c > δ/2,
(1− β)k · ηtηd ·
(
1
βτ
− (τ + 0.2) · c
)
> τ2kηdηt.
Let W be a random variable with probability distribution B(τ2kηdηt, 1/(ηdηt)). According to the chernoff bound
(lemma D.1), we have
∀k′ < τ2 · k, Pr[X(r, k) ≤ k′] ≤ Pr[W ≤ τ · k] ≤ f
(
k′
τ2 · k − 1
)τ2k
.
Y (r, k) ≥ k only if the adversary generates at least k timer blocks in round [r, r+), which implies the adversary
finds k timer blocks in (r+ − r)βm ≤ k/τ queries. Similarly, we can get
∀k′ > k/τ, Pr[Y (r, k) ≥ k′] ≤ f
(
τ · k′
k
− 1
)k/τ
.
Now we will study the probability that
∃n ≥ N(r + r∆),MaxTH(Bn,r)−MaxTH(Bminn ) ≤ γ.
Let t denote the largest timer height such that no malicious block in BgenN(r) has timer height t. So there must be
an honest block with timer height t in BmaxN(r). We denote the earliest one by bt. Notice that all the honest blocks b
generated no earlier than round r satisfy BminN(r) ⊆ b.past in an admissible environment and thus they can not appear
in Bn,r for any n ≥ N(r).
Let n1 be the index of hGenRls event for bt (notice that n1 < N(r)). If there exists n2 ≥ N(r + r∆) such that
MaxTH(Bminn2 )−MaxTH(Bn2,r) ≤ γ, we find integers k1 and k2 which satisfy
N(r − z · (k1 − 1)) ≤n1 < N(r − z · k1)
N(r + z · k2) ≤n2 < N(r + z · (k2 + 1))
Let k∆ = k1+k2. Since τ−1 > δ/4 and r∆ ≥ 4·z(γ+2)/δ, we have k2 ≥ r∆/z = 4·(γ+2)/δ > (γ+2)/(τ−1).
Thus
MaxTH(Bminn2 )−MaxTH(Bn2,r) ≤ γ < (τ − 1) · k2 − 2 ≤ (τ − 1) · k∆ − 2.
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Then one of the following two inequalities must holds
MaxTH(Bminn2 ) ≤ t+ τ · k∆
MaxTH(Bn2,r) ≥ t+ 2 + k∆
For the case MaxTH(Bminn2 ) ≤ t+ τ · k∆, let rs = r− z · k1, re = r+ z · k2. Then MaxTH(BminN(re)) ≤ t+ τ · k∆
because N(re) < n2. Since bt is the first timer block with height t and it is generated earlier than round rs, we have
MaxTH(BmaxN(rs)) ≥ t. So it will be
X(r − z · k1, k∆) = MaxTH(BminN(re))−MaxTH(BmaxN(rs)) ≤ τ · k∆.
For the case MaxTH(Bn2) ≥ t + 2 + k∆, let rs = r − z · (k1 − 1), re = r + z · (k2 + 1). Since bt is the first
timer block with height t and it is generated no earlier than round rs and Bn2,r ⊆ BN(re),r, the adversary generates
at least 2 + k∆ blocks in rounds [rs, re). It means
Y (r + z · (k1 − 1), k∆ + 2) ≥ k∆ + 2.
Notice that k1, k2 may be dependent with random variable X(r, k) and Y (r, k). So we take a union bound over all
the possible k1, k2. Since r∆ > z · 64δ2 · log( 8400εδ2 ), we have k2 ≥ 64δ2 · log( 8400εδ2 ). Notice that 1/(1 − e−x) < 1.01/x
for 0 < x < 1/64 and τ ≤ 2. It can be verified that f(τ − 1) ≤ exp(−δ2/32) and f(1/τ − 1) ≤ exp(−δ2/32). Let
y := 64δ2 · log( 8400εδ2 ), we have
Pr
[∃n ≥ N(r + r∆),MaxTH(Bminn )−MaxTH(Bn,r) ≤ γ]
≤
∞∑
k1=0
∞∑
k2=dye
(Pr[X(r − z · k1, k∆) ≤ τk∆] + Pr[Y (r − z · (k1 − 1), k∆ + 2) ≥ k∆ + 2])
=
∞∑
k1=0
∞∑
k2=dye
(
f(1/τ − 1)τ2k∆ + f(1− τ)(k∆+2)/τ
)
≤
∞∑
k1=0
∞∑
k2=dye
(
exp
(−δ2/32 · τ2k∆)+ exp(−δ2/32 · (k∆ + 2)/τ))
≤
∞∑
k1=0
∞∑
k2=dye
2 exp(−δ2/64 · (k1 + k2))
<
8400
δ4
· exp
(
−δ2/64 · 64
δ2
· log
(
8400
εδ2
))
=ε
Next we will study the probability that
MaxTH(Bn,n)−MaxTH(Bminn ) ≥ γ.
Similarly, let t denote the largest timer height such that no malicious block in Bgenn has timer height t. So there
must be an honest block with timer height t in BmaxN(r). We denote the earliest one by bt. Notice that all the honest
blocks b generated no earlier than round r satisfyBminN(r) ⊆ b.past in an admissible environment. So any honest block
generated no earlier than round r can not be in Bn,r for any n.

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C.1 Proof of Theorem 4.10
Proof. Let Bn,r :=
{
b ∈ Bgenn
∣∣∣BminN(r) * b.past ∨ b ∈ BminN(r)}, r∆ := ηtηdm · max{ 129δ2 · log( 9000εδ2 ), 8(ηb+3)δ } and
r1 := r2 − r∆ + d+ 1.
All the blocks generated earlier than round r1− d belong toBminN(r1). So they also belong toBN(r2),r1 . Notice that
d+ 1 = ληd/m ≤ ηtηdδ/(2m), thus
r2 − r1 = r∆ − d− 1 ≥ ηtηd
m
·max
{
128
δ2
· log
(
9000
εδ2
)
,
8(ηb + 2)
δ
}
.
According to lemma C.1 , we have
Pr
[
MaxTH(BminN(r2))−MaxTH(BN(r2),r1) ≤ ηb
]
≤ 14
15
· ε.
Notice that Old(BminN(r2),b) = False holds only if MaxTH(B
min
N(r2)
) − TimerHeight(b) < ηb. As long as
MaxTH(BminN(r2))−MaxTH(BN(r2),r1) ≤ ηb, all the blocks generated earlier than round r1 − d will be old enough
given BminN(r2). This holds with exception probability 14/15 · ε.
By the definition of potential value, for any S andb, we havePwith(S,b) ≤ SubTW(Bgen\Bmax,b), Padv(S,b) ≤
sh + sm ≤ ηw and Psp(S,b) ≤ SubTW
(
B∆ ∩M,b). Notice that Bgen\Bmax only contains malicious blocks (a.k.a.
Bgen\Bmax ⊆ M) and B∆ = Bmax\Bmin. We claim Bgen\Bmax and B∆ ∩M are disjoint sets and there union is
subset of or equal to Bgen ∩M. In all,
P (S,b) ≤ ηw + SubTW(Bgen ∩M,b).
It implies that P (SN(r2),b) − ηw is no more than the total weight of malicious blocks after b’s generation. Let
Mi denote the total block weight of malicious blocks generated in round i. Then, for any block b generated no earlier
than round r1 − d, for any n with N(r2) < n ≤ N(r2 + 1), we have
P (Sn,b)− ηw ≤
r2∑
i=r1−d
Mi.
Let p1(t) := exp
(
(etηw−1)·βm
ηwηd
)
, for any t > 0 and any k ∈ R, according to lemma B.5, we have
Pr
[
r2∑
i=r1−d
Mi ≥ k
]
≤ p1(t)r∆/etk.
Let t := δ2/(150λ), k := 2λ/(d+ 1) · r∆, we have
p1(t)
r∆/etk ≤ exp(−δ2/150 · r∆/(d+ 1)).
Note that ηtηd/m = 2(d+ 1). Thus r∆/(d+ 1) ≥ 300δ2 · log( 9000εδ2 ) > 150δ2 · log( 9000ε ). So we claim
exp(−δ2/150 · r∆/(d+ 1)) ≤ ε
9000
.
It implies with exception probability ε9000 , for any block b generated no earlier than round r1 − d, for any n with
N(r2) < n ≤ N(r2 + 1), P (Sn,b) − ηw ≤ 2λ/(d + 1) · r∆ holds for any block b generated no earlier than round
r1 − d and N(r2) < n ≤ N(r2 + 1).
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Now we have showed that for any block generated earlier than round r1 − d, they all become old enough at the
beginning of round r2 with exception probability 14ε15 . For the other blocks, their block potential value will never
exceed 2λ/(d+ 1) · r∆ + ηw in round r2 with exception probability ε9000 . Notice that
2λ/(d+ 1) · r∆ + ηw
=
30λ
δ
+ 4λ ·max
{
129
δ2
· log
(
9000
εδ2
)
,
8(ηb + 3)
δ
}
<4λ ·max
{
140
δ2
· log
(
9000
εδ2
)
,
8(ηb + 4)
δ
}
In all, for any r2 ≥ 0 and ε > 0, we have
Pr
[
∃N(r2) < n ≤ N(r2 + 1),∃b ∈ B˜r2 , P (Sn,b) ≥ w(ε)
]
≤ 14ε
15
+
ε
9000
< ε.

C.2 Proof of Theorem 4.12
Proof. Let Bn,r :=
{
b ∈ Bgenn
∣∣∣BminN(r) * b.past ∨ b ∈ BminN(r)}. If there exists n and b satisfying b ∈ Bgenn ,
BminN(r) * b.past and Old(B
min
n ,b) = False, we claim b ∈ Bn,r and MaxTH(Bminn ) − TimerHeight(b) ≤ ηb.
Thus, MaxTH(Bminn )− TimerHeight(Bn,r) ≤ ηb. According to lemma C.1, it will happen with probability ε. 
D Chernoff bound
Lemma D.1 (Multiplicative Chernoff bound) Let X be a random variable with binomial distribution B(n, p), then
for any δ > 0, we have
Pr [X ≥ (1 + δ)np] ≤
(
eδ
(1 + δ)1+δ
)np
.
Pr [X ≤ (1− δ)np] ≤
(
e−δ
(1− δ)1−δ
)np
.
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